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1. Introduction  
Under unlawful Indonesian occupation from 1976 to 1999, East Timor suffered massive 
human rights abuses.1 The estimates are uncertain, but somewhere between 102,800 and 
200,000 East Timorese are believed to have lost their lives as a consequence, during this 24-
year period.2 The external, imposed rule ended in 1999 with a planned scorched earth 
campaign from the Indonesian military that involved numerous atrocities and cost the lives of 
over 1,000 East Timorese. A multinational intervention – INTERFET – managed to quell the 
violence, and the UN took temporarily over administration of the territory.  In May 2002, East 
Timor joined the world society as an independent nation.  
 
As any post-conflict society where human rights violations on this scale have been 
committed, East Timor has gone through, and still is in, a process of transitional justice. 
Transitional justice can be defined as the “set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that 
arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at 
confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law”.3 This is a 
broad definition, which includes both judicial and non-judicial measures – everything from 
trials and purges, to addressing underlying social and economic issues that produce conflict. 
This thesis will be focused on the aspects of transitional justice that have been central in the 
East Timorese-Indonesian context – justice and reconciliation. 
 
In line with the extension of democracy and humanitarian values to ever greater areas of the 
world, the idea that there should be some form of accountability for grave and large scale 
violations of human rights has been increasing. Intuitively, justice, defined as judicial 
prosecution is seen as positive and righteous. As gross and widespread atrocities have often 
occurred in conflict situations, it is also argued that justice must come first, for subsequent 
                                                 
1
 East Timor’s official name is Timor-Leste. However, this thesis will utilise the English name. 
2
 “Chega! The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation: Timor -Leste: Executive 
Summary”, The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CRTR), 2005, 44, 
http://www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm; James Dunn, East Timor: a Rough Passage to Independence, (Double 
Bay, NSW: Longueville, 2003),  278. 
3
 The concept of transitional justice is defined with variations in the literature. Some, as Bassiouni, instead use 
the term post-conflict justice, but this can be problematic, as violence and human rights transgressions can be 
one-sided state administered upon its own population. The definition used here is from Naomi Roth-Arriaza, 
“The New Landscape of Transitional Justice”, in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth 
Versus Justice ,ed. Naomi Roth-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena, 2, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006).; M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Introduction”, in Post Conflict Justice, ed, M. Cherif Bassiouni, xv, (New York: 
Transnational Publishers, 2002). 
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peace to be genuine and lasting. At the same time, there has also been growing apprehension 
that a rigid pursuit of accountability can be problematic. There can be practical, political or 
other challenges that limit the form and extent of accountability. Insistence on legal 
prosecutions can endanger fragile agreements needed to keep peace and stability. Moreover, 
there are requirements in a post-conflict society that legal processes cannot meet. Very often a 
post-conflict society will be in a dire need of reconciliatory measures, but efforts to promote 
reconciliation can be contradictory to the pursuit of criminal justice. Accordingly, there is 
disagreement among scholars on what form accountability should take. This has generally 
been described as the peace versus justice debate. The central dilemmas are: can there be 
peace, stability and democracy without justice; and can there be justice without a legal 
process?4 This thesis will discuss these problems in the East Timorese context.  
 
1.1 Research questions  
Most often the peace versus justice debate takes the form of a trial versus truth commission 
debate.5 ‘Justice’ is equated with criminal prosecution through trials – and for the purpose of 
this thesis, this will be the definition of justice unless otherwise stated. Truth commissions on 
the other hand are seen to embody elements promoting peace, often conceptualised as 
‘reconciliation’. ‘Reconciliation’ denotes coming together, a renewal of friendship, return to 
normality and restoration of harmony.6 This can include forgiveness, development of mutual 
trust, and establishment of a “common narrative of the past and a shared vision of the 
future”.7 Reconciliation can be both an outcome and a process, and states can move on a 
continuum towards more and more reconciliation.8 There are also reconciliatory measures 
which aim to bring about reconciliation, such as truth-finding, physical or verbal contact 
between conflicting parties and symbolic or ritual ceremonies.9 It is further possible to 
distinguish between reconciliation based on truth-finding and reconciliation based more on 
political negotiation. The first type can include the use of truth commissions and/or judicial 
                                                 
4
 Edel, Hughes et al. “Introduction”, in Atrocities and International Accountability: Beyond Transitional Justice, 
eds. Edel Hughes et al., 2, (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007). 
5
 Ibid., 2. 
6
 Erin Daly and Jeremy Sarkin, Reconciliation in divided societies: Finding Common Ground, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 5. 
7
 Elin Skaar et al., “Introduction” in Roads to Reconciliation, eds. Elin Skaar, et al., 4, (Lanham Md: Lexington 
Books, 2005).  
8
 Daly and Sarkin, Reconciliation, 7. 
9
 These measures are aimed to bring about reconciliation, whether they really do will be discussed later in the 
thesis.; William J. Long and Peter Brecke, War and Reconciliation, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 6-7. 
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measures to establish a truth that is either research-based or court-decided. In the second case 
these measures can be, but are not necessarily utilised, and the reconciliation will be highly 
based on political negotiations and actions. Truth-finding can be part of these efforts, but it 
will take the form more of political debate on the official understanding of the past.10 
 
There have been two tribunals established – the Serious Crimes Process (SCP) in East Timor 
and the Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta – to obtain justice for past atrocities in East Timor. However, 
both of these failed to hold perpetrators of the most serious crimes legally accountable. At the 
same time, the process of transitional justice has both domestically in East Timor and 
bilaterally between East Timor and Indonesia been characterised by an emphasis on 
reconciliation. This reconciliation has been founded on research-based truth by truth 
commissions, and political negotiation. It has been illustrated by statements from East 
Timorese and Indonesian state leaders, and been represented by institutional measures. Two 
truth commissions have taken place: the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
in East Timor (CRTR), and the joint East Timorese – Indonesian Commission for Truth and 
Friendship (CTF). While the CRTR was a mix of reconciliation founded on research-based 
truth and on political negotiation, the CTF involved reconciliation based more on political 
negotiation and a politically negotiated truth.  
 
Due to the failure to produce legal accountability, however, the transitional justice process in 
East Timor has largely been seen as unsuccessful. Victims, civil society organisations and 
scholars, have criticised the process and argued that past atrocities in East Timor have not 
been adequately addressed.11 The main complaint has been the lack of prosecutorial justice, 
but they have also criticised the politically reconciliatory emphasis of the process. The East 
Timorese government has been criticised for its reconciliatory policies and refusal to support 
attempts at legal justice. The bilateral CTF with its emphasis on a politically negotiated 
                                                 
10
 The momentous South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission essentially centred on reconciliation 
through research based truth-finding. The East Timorese reconciliation process has, as will be further outlined, 
been more a mix of reconciliation through research-based truth and political negotiation. 
11
 See for example: Lia Kent “Community Views of Justice and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste”, Development 
Bulletin, 68, (2005).; Damian Greenfell, “When Remembering isn’t Enough”, Arena Magazine, 80, (2005-
2006).; Megan Hirst, “Too Much Friendship, Too Little Truth”,  ICTJ, January 2008.; Lucy Williamson “Justice 
and Compassion in East Timor”, BBC, July 4, 2008.; Jill Jolliffe “Compromising Justice in East Timor”, Far 
Eastern Economic Review, (April 2006).; “Etan Renew Call for Meaningful Justice for Victims of Indonesian 
Occupation: International Tribunal Needed in Wake of Commission of Truth and Friendship Report”, East 
Timor and Indonesian Action Network (ETAN), July 14, (2008) http://www.etan.org/news/2008/07ctf.htm.; “An 
Open Letter in response to the CTF report: The truth is there, now we need Justice”, Timor-Leste National 
Alliance for International Tribunal (ANTI), July 15 (2008), http://www.etan.org/news/2008/07anti.htm. 
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reconciliation has also been castigated for paying scant concern to justice and for being only a 
political exercise. In other words, a more judicially focused process and legal accountability 
has been called for. 
However, this criticism does not always take into account the practical, moral and political 
constraints that would have been involved in producing judicial responsibility, and the 
positive outcomes that the reconciliatory focused process nevertheless has produced. 
Moreover, it is also controversial whether judicial accountability would have been the optimal 
way of addressing past atrocities in this specific context. The purpose of the thesis is to 
address these issues. This will be achieved by asking two research questions:  
 
(1) What factors explain why the process of transitional justice for past human rights 
violations in East Timor has become more reconciliatory than judicially focused?  
 
(2) What consequences has this had for East Timor? 
 
The first research question aims at understanding why the process has turned more 
reconciliatory than judicially focused. Can the East Timorese government really be criticised 
or have there been valid reasons for its reconciliatory focus? The second research question 
relates to the consequences of the lack of prosecutorial justice, and the reconciliatory policies. 
This thesis is not concerned with all the consequences per se, but aims to find out whether the 
lack of justice has had as negative effects as critics claim. Can it be argued that the lack of 
prosecutorial justice not has been as detrimental after all? And that the reconciliatory policies 
and measures have had several positive effects? This necessitates a discussion of the various 
measures used – both aimed towards justice and reconciliation – and their utility and effects. 
The aim of this thesis is to question the possibility and utility of prosecution for addressing 
past atrocities in East Timor. It is also to ask whether some of the criticism towards lack of 
accountability in the East Timorese transitional justice process should be reconsidered.  
 
1.2 Methodological and analytical framework  
This is a qualitative analysis with a main focus on the empirical case of East Timor. It is 
written within the genre of contemporary history, but the subject matter of transitional justice 
also necessitates walks into other social sciences, most notably political science and law. The 
issue area of transitional justice is part of a burgeoning literature on states emerging from 
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conflict and/or authoritarian rule seeking to transform into peaceful and democratic societies. 
The subject of this thesis should therefore be seen against the theoretical backdrop of 
democratisation and peacebuilding.  
 
Democratisation is the process aimed to promote democracy, defined by Jarstad as “opening 
up political space, including improvements regarding contestation, participation and human 
rights”.12 Democratisation includes a call for justice, as a democracy emphasises rule of law 
and protection of human rights. In East Timor, as justice has not been present, it can therefore 
be asked: to what extent did the lack of prosecutorial justice lead to democratic deficits, 
especially to lack of rule of law?  
 
Peacebuilding denotes measures taken after war is over, that are aimed towards preventing 
renewed conflict and building a self-sustaining peace. This involves identifying and 
addressing fundamental causes of conflict at all levels – social, economical, political, 
institutional and psychological.13 Reconciliation is an important part of peacebuilding. 
Logically, there can be no peace in a society if antagonism between different groups or 
individuals is still present. Reconciliation, or a certain degree of it, is a necessary pre-requisite 
for any peace. Reconciliation is also connected to democracy, as it establishes national unity, 
which is a necessary precondition for democracy. As Sørensen writes, a fundamental 
requirement for democracy is a general consensus on who the nation consists of – who are the 
demos that will rule in the democracy.14 Moreover, for a democracy to work, in addition to 
institutions, rights and liberties, there needs to be societal agreement to have a democracy and 
people must be willing to recognise and adhere to decisions made by others.15 Reconciliation 
is the glue that in the words of Daly and Sarkin, facilitates “the minimally cohesive society 
that is necessary for democracy to function”.16 A question that therefore will be analysed in 
                                                 
12
 Anna K. Jarstad, “Dilemmas of war-to-democracy transitions: theories and concepts”, in From War to 
Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding,eds. Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, 17, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
13
 There is as yet no uniform definition of what peacebuilding is, or what strategies specifically it entails, but the 
most common interpretation is based on “An Agenda for Peace” by Boutros-Boutrous Gali in 1992, which is the 
one here briefly described.; Alex J. Bellamy et al., Understanding Peacekeeping, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2004), 236-237. 
14
 Georg Sørensen, Democracy and Democratization, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2008), 47.; Daly and 
Sarkin, Reconciliation, 19. 
15
 Daly and Sarkin, Reconciliation, 19. 
16
 Ibid., 19. 
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this thesis is whether the reconciliatory measures used in East Timor really furthered 
reconciliation and national unity. 
 
An analytical framework rooted in transitional justice will also be utilised. In their article 
“Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of International War Crime Tribunals and 
Transitional Justice”, Snyder and Vinjamuri analyse the literature on transitional justice and 
argue that it can be divided into three different orientations – legalism, pragmatism and an 
emotional psychology approach.17 These three approaches sum up the central theoretical and 
empirical tendencies in the transitional justice literature to the dilemma of peace and justice. 
The approaches can be thought of as theoretical paradigms as they are built on different logics 
and postulate certain causal relationships. They also each prescribe different solutions to the 
transitional justice dilemma. The legalist strand represents what will try to be challenged in 
this paper – the utility of prosecution for addressing past crimes. Opposed to it stands the 
emotional psychology and the pragmatist approach that emphasise respectively the utility of a 
pragmatic approach, and an approach focused more on truth and reconciliation. As they can 
be seen to represent different attitudes to the transitional justice debate in East Timor, it is 
fruitful to connect these paradigms to the empirical facts and assess whether their causal 
claims hold. The three orientations will be outlined further in chapter two. 
 
In working with this thesis, there have been certain methodological problems that should be 
mentioned. Firstly, the contemporariness of the case and the fact that it is a sensitive and 
controversial issue in both states still, has made it difficult to obtain source-material regarding 
certain aspects of the process. The final report of the CTF has not yet been released to the 
public. The analysis on the CTF is therefore based on an advance copy that has leaked to the 
press.18 Moreover, some other information, such as concerning internal political preferences 
both in East Timor and in Indonesia has been difficult to access due to language barriers. A 
further challenge has been the absence of theory in the transitional justice literature. Despite 
generalisations, there is no extensive criminological theory for international – and/or state-
                                                 
17
 Leslie Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder, “Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of International War Crime 
Tribunals and Transitional Justice”, Annual Review of Political Science, 2004: 345-362.  
18
 It has been attempted to obtain an official copy from the East Timorese government but this did not succeed. It 
has however, been confirmed from a former member of the Commission that the copy available from 
www.wikileak.com is authentic. 
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crimes, as there is for domestic crimes.19 As Jennifer Balint argues, the debate between 
concerns over justice or peace – might be the nearest thing we have to an international 
criminology.20 Nevertheless, as Schabas and Thakur remarks, studies of individual situations 
still gives added knowledge.21 The aim of this study is therefore not to generalise but to add a 
facet to our understanding of the East Timorese transitional justice process, that can be used 
the greater goal of improved comprehension on how to best address past atrocities.  
 
1. 3 Sources and Literature 
The literature relevant for this thesis can mainly be divided into two groups: texts concerning 
transitional justice and texts concerning East Timor and transitional justice. The research field 
of transitional justice originated in the study of the tribunals and transitions in the defeated 
states post World War II. From the milestone of Shklar’s book Legalism from 1964, it gained 
momentum in the 1970’s and 1980’s, with an emphasis mainly on trials and criminal justice 
as a means to promote human rights.22 In the late 1980s and 1990s, with the wave of new 
democracies, and increased attention to peacebuilding and the correlation between democracy 
and peace, the field was taken into the democratisation and peacebuilding literature. One 
started looking at how addressing past atrocities could promote democratic change and peace. 
Writers such as Orentlicher, Teitel and Bassiouni, built on Shklar’s legalist approach and 
advocated the preventive, deterrent and democracy-promoting effect of justice.23 Others, such 
as Huntington and Kissinger advocated a more sceptical, pragmatic approach to the value of 
transitional justice. Simultaneously, the scope widened to include non-judicial measures such 
as truth commissions, with Hayner’s Unspeakable Truth as a prominent example.24 Minow 
                                                 
19
 Jennifer L. Balint, “The Place of Law in Addressing Internal Regime Conflicts”, Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 59, No. 4, (1996): 111. 
20
 Ibid., 112. 
21
 Schabas, William and Ramesh Thakur, “Concluding Remarks”, in Atrocities and International Accountability: 
Beyond Transitional Justice, eds. Edel Hughes et al., 284 (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007).  
22
 Judith Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964). 
23
 Diane F. Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: The duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime” 
The Yale Law Journal, 100, no. 8, (1991): 2540-2543.; Bassiouni, Postconflict Justice.; Ruti Teitel, Transitional 
Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
24
 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity, (New York: Routledge, 
2002). 
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and Kritz have given respectively more balanced and comprehensive analysis of the universe 
of transitional justice measures, their use and functions.25  
 
The process of transitional justice in East Timor has received considerable attention, taken 
into account the small size of the state. There is substantial information and literature on the 
subject, though it is not overabundant. Much of the literature however, focuses on a specific 
measure, such as either the one of the tribunals or the truth commissions. There are minor 
articles that look on the various measures together. Most of these articles do see some positive 
sides with the CRTR, but they still tend to follow the legalist paradigm, and do not look 
critically at the consequences of lack of prosecution. Some, as Van Zyl, miss the political 
element, and do not discuss causes or the implications of the attitude East Timorese leaders 
have taken to the problem.26 Nearly all of them flog the CTF for being a political exercise that 
would undermine both truth and justice. And none look critically at how justice by trials is 
essentially a western concept, vastly different to traditional East Timorese methods of conflict 
resolution and justice. Kingston gives a constructive account of the balance between political 
and judicial interests.27 Still, he does not question the preventive or deterrent effect of 
pursuing justice, or incorporate the conflict of traditional versus western forms of justice, and 
he does consider the final results of the CTF. In other words there are few who have discussed 
the subjects this thesis address in a comprehensive manner. None give a broader, more 
inclusive account, where the utility of criminal justice is more critically examined, as will be 
aimed to be achieved here. 
 
The sources utilised for this paper are by no means an exhaustive list, but they were still able 
to provide a solid grounding for answering the research questions. They were balanced 
against each other to ensure objectivity and accuracy, and empirical facts have only 
established when they were based on independent and supportive sources. Due to the wide 
scope of the thesis, a considerable amount of secondary literature has been necessary. 
Scholarly books and articles have been used to establish empirical facts and give an overview 
                                                 
25
 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998).; Neill Kritz, Transitional 
Justice: how emerging Democracies Reckon with former Regimes, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1995). 
26
 Paul van Zyl, “Dealing with the Past: Reflections on South Africa, East Timor and Indonesian”, in Beginning 
to Remember: The past in the Indonesian Present ed. Mary S. Zurbuchen (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2005). 
27
 Kingston, Jeffrey. “Balancing Justice and Reconciliation in East Timor.” Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 3 
(2006): 271-302. 
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of the process and various measures. A broad range of such material has been consulted also 
to ensure objective and accurate information. Reports from NGO’s, especially the ICTJ28 and 
also a few from governmental institutions, have been crucial in providing details about 
various aspects of the process: public perceptions, and the causes, functioning and effects of 
measures. These reports are thorough, and they are most often written by authors who were 
there and experienced the work of the tribunals and truth commissions first hand. Still, they 
are at times written to promote the cause of something, often the pursuit of criminal justice, 
and they were read with this in mind and balanced against other sources. Both scholarly books 
and articles, and reports from NGO’s have also been used to provide facts of political and 
social development of East Timor, the stability and rule of law situation in the state. News 
material has added to empirical knowledge with details on views of individuals, information 
on CTF and other issues. Speeches and other statements from individuals involved in the 
process have also provided information on their views towards the subject. These sources 
have been tempered with additional information from newspapers and other secondary 
sources, due to the difference that can exist between what people say and what they mean. 
UN-documents, and other official documents concerning the establishment and work of the 
institutions, such as terms of references, and final reports has given information on the 
intention and outcome of the various measures. Final reports have had to be evaluated against 
other types of sources to make sure they do not give a too positive description of own 
achievements.  
 
1. 4 Structure of thesis 
Chapter two will first give a short introductory background to the history of Indonesia’s 
occupation over East Timor, focusing mainly on the human rights violations committed. It 
will further outline the three different approaches to transitional justice, legalism, pragmatism 
and the emotional-psychology approach. 
 
Chapter three will discuss the first research question – why the process of transitional justice 
has turned more reconciliatory than judicial. The chapter is divided into three main focus 
areas – the Indonesian attitude, the positions of the international community and the UN, and 
East Timorese dilemmas and positions. The key argument is that fierce opposition from 
                                                 
28
 International Centre for Transitional Justice, see www.ictj.org. 
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Indonesia, a disinterested international society’s and internal challenges made the East 
Timorese political leadership more inclined to pursue a politically negotiated type of 
reconciliation than to pursue justice.  
After having established why the transitional justice process became more posited towards 
reconciliation than justice, chapters four and five will turn attention to the second research 
question: the consequences this has produced. In order to do this in a systematic way it will be 
focused on the measures and institutions established to address past atrocities, and their 
outcomes will be evaluated. At the same time the measures applied will be seen in the light of 
the legalist-, pragmatic- and the emotional psychology-approaches, and the causal claims the 
supporters of these paradigms advocate will be assessed. The judicial measures will be 
discussed in chapter four, while the non-judicial, reconciliatory measures will be discussed in 
chapter five.  
 
Chapter six draws together the main findings of this thesis. Both the empirical outcomes and 
the implications this has for the theoretical approaches will be discussed. 
 
It should be noted that the main focus of this thesis is on East Timor of following a 
reconciliatory approach and not having justice, but it will to some extent also involve 
Indonesia where this is natural. The space limitations of this thesis necessitate this selectivity. 
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2. Background  
 
2.1 Human rights violations in East Timor  
East Timor is situated around 500km north of Darwin, Australia, and shares the island of 
Timor with the Indonesian West-Timor to its left. It came under interest from both Dutch and 
Portuguese colonial aspirations from the 16th century, but it was the Portuguese who in the 
end managed to best establish control. The Portuguese dominance over East Timor was weak 
until the early 20th century. With the coming to power of the fascist government under 
Antonio Salazar in the 1930s, the Portuguese political grip over East Timor tightened, and 
Lisbon was intent not to let go of any colonial possessions.29 
 
The coup overthrowing the fascist Caetano regime in Portugal in April 1974 opened the way 
for decolonisation of East Timor. The new, leftist Spinola government stated in June 1974 
that it envisaged self-determination for East Timor, either in the form of continued Portuguese 
rule, Indonesian rule or independence.30 East Timorese political parties soon formed and the 
two most important, UDT31 and FRETILIN32 established an alliance and worked together 
with the colonial authorities for future self-determination. Certain elements in the Indonesian 
military however, were convinced that independence for East Timor would be detrimental to 
Indonesia and the only option was integration. They started a covert destabilisation program 
that undermined the alliance, and coupled with disagreements between the parties, helped 
drive the UDT and FRETILIN into a brutal civil war in August – September 1975.33 When the 
pro-independence party FRETILIN came victoriously out of the war, Indonesia resolved that 
it was time to intervene. After an escalation of military attacks starting in September 1975 
they launched a full-scale invasion on December 7, 1975.34 The invasion was brutal, with 
numerous instances of indiscriminate executions and mass killings, rape and property 
                                                 
29
 Bill Nicol, Timor the Stillborn Nation, (Camberwell, Vic.: Widescope, 1978), 12, 17, 20; Dunn, East Timor, 
16-17. 
30
 Matthew Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, (Tuscon: Odonian Press, 1995), 25. 
31
 UDT – Uniao Democratica Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union). 
32
 FRETILIN – Frente Revolucionaria da Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front of East Timor). 
33
 The destabilisation program -”Operasi Komodo” - was constructed by ranking officers in the Indonesian army, 
and its aim was to incorporate East Timor into Indonesia as fast as possible. In the beginning the emphasis was 
on non-military means, propaganda and subversion, to divide the East Timorese political parties and promote the 
image of Indonesian rule. In 1975 it widened to include military exercises and covert military operations by 
September.; Dunn, 92-95,185; Jardine, East Timor, 28. 
34
 Jardine, East Timor, 31. 
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destruction.35 In 1976 after two months in mid-February, 60,000 East Timorese were dead. On 
July 17, 1976 East Timor was formally annexed by Indonesia as its 27th province.36 The 
invasion and continued occupation of East Timor was a blatant transgression of two important 
aspects of international law, the prohibition on aggression, and the right to self-
determination.37 The East Timorese independence resistance, led by FRETILIN continued an 
armed struggle against the illegitimate Indonesia rule until 1999.38  
 
Indonesian governance of the territory was characterised by harsh oppression, both towards 
the resistance movement and civilians. Approximately 102,800 to 200,000 East Timorese died 
in conflict related deaths during the Indonesian occupation (1975-1999).39 Though not defined 
as a genocide, mass killings took place (in Lacluta, 1981, Kraras, 1983 and Dili, 1991), and 
numerous other human rights violations that have been defined as war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.40 The range and number of human rights violations is extensive, covering 
arbitrary detention, torture, forced displacement, violence and sexual violence, enforced 
disappearances and unlawful killings.41 Though different East Timorese groups also were 
guilty of transgressing human rights, it is clear that the main party responsible for most human 
rights violations was the Indonesian National Army – ABRI/TNI.42  
 
The unlawful invasion and brutal occupation of East Timor by Indonesia was acknowledged 
by the international community, but little was done to stop it. The international attitude 
changed in the 1990s with more comprehensive media coverage and increased international 
attention to human rights violations. The Dili Massacre in 1991, when the Indonesian military 
cracked mercilessly down on East Timorese who were attending a pro-independence march, 
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was broadcasted internationally and opened the world’s eyes for the Indonesian repression.43 
Both domestically and internationally, demands for change in Indonesia’s East Timor policy 
intensified. When Suharto stepped down in 1998, his successor Habibie bowed for pressure 
and allowed for a UN-monitored plebiscite on independence for East Timor.44  
 
However, members of ABRI/TNI who had occupied central roles in the administration and 
repression of East Timor rejected this solution.45 Early in 1999 they set up militias and 
organised a campaign of intimidation that included violence, kidnapping, murder, massacres 
and sexual violence.46 This did not deter the East Timorese who on the August 30, 1999,  in a 
98 per cent turn out, voted with 78.5 per cent against continued integration with Indonesia –
and yes to independence.  
 
The result of the ballot was released on September 3, 1999. The TNI had expected the 
outcome and had planned scorched-earth operation, Operasi Guntur / Wiradharma, as a 
revenge against the East Timorese for having voted for independence.47 Together with the 
militias they went on a spree of violence and destruction that lasted roughly from September 4 
to September 20, 1999.48 This was an operation of brutality that included numerous human 
rights violations. These were for example murder, mass murder, sexual violence, torture, 
violence against children, forced displacement and transgression of important social rights 
such as destruction of shelter and property theft.49 It claimed the lives of more than 1,000 
people. In addition around 70 to 80 per cent of East Timor’s buildings and infrastructure were 
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destroyed and a quarter of the population, around 250,000 people, were forcibly displaced to 
Indonesian West Timor.50 The violence and destruction of 1999 is often described as 
perpetrated mainly by pro-integrationist East Timorese militias. However investigation has 
shown that it was carefully planned by certain senior TNI personnel who sponsored, trained, 
armed, encouraged and organised it.51 They therefore bear the main responsibility for the 
crimes committed. This responsibility stretches as far as to General Wiranto, former head of 
the TNI.52 Since the human rights violations committed in East Timor in 1999 were so grave, 
and were systematically and deliberately planned and carried out, they are characterised as 
crimes against humanity.53 
 
The Indonesian military was responsible for maintaining security but instead created terror.54  
The media image reached the world and caused international outcry. After strong pressure 
from important parties such as the US, Australia, the IBRD and the IMF, Habibie allowed a 
UN-authorised multinational force, INTERFET, to intervene to restore peace and security.55 
INTERFET was deployed on September 20, 1999 and by five months it had managed to 
successfully end the violence and establish a secure environment.56 The TNI and the militias 
retreated and Indonesia acknowledged that East Timor was lost. On October 20, 1999, the 
Indonesian parliament annulled the incorporation of East Timor, and the UN took over the 
administration of the territory.57 INTERFET was replaced by the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on February 23, 2000. UNTAET was given the 
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complex and challenging task to govern, rebuild and prepare the East Timorese society for 
independence.58 On May 20, 2002, East Timor finally became an independent nation, when 
the authority over East Timor was formally transferred from UNTAET to the first elected East 
Timorese government. 
 
2.2 Transitional justice – three approaches 
As East Timor was released from the Indonesian shackles to become an independent nation, 
the question of how to deal with the atrocities of the past arose. In the literature of transitional 
justice, Vinjamuri and Snyder have argued that the attitude to this topic can be divided in 
three strands, a legalist, a pragmatic and an emotional psychology approach.59 The debate on 
how to address the human rights violations of the past in the post-conflict situation of East 
Timor and Indonesia can be seen to follow the fault lines of these three approaches. 
 
Considering the number and gravity of the transgressions many argued that criminal 
prosecution was in order. There was a widespread call for justice, from the East Timorese 
themselves, from NGO’s, the UN, and other actors in the international community. The call 
for justice can be seen to represent the rationale of legalism. Legalism emphasises universal 
standards of justice, and scholars writing within this paradigm see judicial processes as the 
optimal way of addressing grave human rights violations. This is supported by retributive and 
preventive arguments. Legalism is based on a ‘logic of appropriateness’, which postulates that 
participants in international politics act on the basis of rules they see as appropriate. 
Therefore, to hinder future human rights violations from occurring, one needs to promote 
rules prohibiting such acts.60 Tribunals, preferably international, are seen as the tools that can 
enforce international law and international humanitarian law. As tribunals enforce 
international law they also function to socialise respect for the rule of law among international 
actors. In this way and by individualising guilt and demonstrating that crimes will not go 
unpunished, trials deter and prevent future international crime. As conflict-resolution by way 
of a legal process and emphasis on rule of law is considered inherent to democratic and liberal 
norms, tribunals are therefore also seen to promote democracy and liberal values. Tribunals 
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are also claimed to prevent future conflict and crime as establishment of accountability is 
argued to end cycles of revenge, hatred and violence. Furthermore, prosecutorial justice is 
seen as necessary to repair the moral imbalance between victim and perpetrator, as it punishes 
the perpetrator it restores the dignity of the victim. 
 
In sum, the legalist position argues that the optimal way of addressing past human rights 
violations in East Timor is by judicial prosecution, as this will restore the moral balance 
between victims and perpetrators, prevent future crimes and conflict, promote rule of law, and 
strengthen central liberal and democratic values. This is seen to be especially important for a 
new democracy, like East Timor, or an authoritarian state in the process of democratising, as 
Indonesia. For these reasons, legalists protest any measures instituted in this context that they 
see as undermining legal accountability. This would most notably be inaction, amnesties, or 
other measures contributing to impunity. Truth commissions as held in Indonesia and East 
Timor, have also been criticised for being politically influenced and for offering no substitute 
to a legal process as they do not satisfy the rights of neither perpetrators nor victims. 
  
The pragmatic approach on the other hand is based on a ‘logic of consequences’ which posits 
that the form accountability should take depends on the effects it will have. As with the 
legalist paradigm, social stability, peace and democracy are the optimal goals, but pragmatist 
scholars are sceptical to that prosecutorial justice always further these goals. The legalist 
argument is a justice-first approach – it sets out the hypothesis that justice must take priority 
over political concerns, as pursuit of justice ultimately will serve the optimal political interests 
– democracy, stability, reconciliation and peace. Pragmatist scholars point out that there can 
often be a tension between these concerns. At times, pragmatists argue that the pursuit of 
justice can be detrimental to peace and stability. Moreover, some argue that legal 
accountability for past atrocities is not imperative to further democratic standards – this can 
be done by other methods such as institutional reform. The pragmatist approach therefore 
stresses peace and democracy over justice, and argues that the ability to obtain justice will 
rather be dependent on these two factors. Transitional justice measures must hence be applied 
and evaluated according to how it will further social peace and democracy. In the case of East 
Timor, pragmatists would emphasise that the pursuit of justice should be secondary to 
prudential and political concerns. Pragmatists would therefore support a politically focused 
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reconciliatory approach, and can be open for measures such as amnesties and argue that this 
can have positive consequences.61  
 
While legalism and pragmatism have been the dominant approaches to transitional justice, 
there is also a third paradigm. The emotional psychology approach is based on a ‘logic of 
emotions’, rooted in social psychology. In contrast to the pragmatist paradigm that is prepared 
to sacrifice all transitional justice measures on the altar of peace and stability, this approach 
underlines the utility of some transitional justice measures as the legalist approach. However, 
these are not necessarily judicial. The emotional psychology approach emphasises 
reconciliation, social harmony and peace, and stresses the utility of truth commissions and 
reconciliatory measures to further these aims. Reconciliation is seen as contingent on 
emotional catharsis of victims, and acknowledgement of responsibility and blame by 
perpetrator. It is argued that this can come about through truth-telling, which therefore also is 
seen to contribute to healing for victims and society. Scholars writing within this paradigm 
further argue that social peace is facilitated when parties to a conflict can find an agreed upon 
version of the truth of the past. A truth commission has a better opportunity of going wider 
and deeper into the past than trials, and can hence contribute to a more accurate, and 
consensus-based version of the truth. In comparison to the legalist-paradigm that is 
perpetrator-centred as it sees retribution against perpetrator as crucial, this approach focuses 
more on victims and survivors. Emotional catharsis is seen as necessary for social peace to be 
established. Regarding East Timor, this approach would argue that truth commissions would 
facilitate emotional catharsis, individual and societal healing, and social peace. 
 
It should be mentioned that this trichotomy consists of ideal types of approaches. There are 
scholars writing within more than one of these paradigms. Still, human rights activists, 
victim-groups and many scholars that have criticised the transitional justice process in East 
Timor for its lack of criminal prosecution can be seen to belong mainly to the legalist 
paradigm. What is also noteworthy, is that all these approaches to a certain extent makes 
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claims about consequences - they are all concerned with being the best response to atrocities, 
to prevent future atrocities, to contribute to social peace and democracy. It is therefore useful 
to evaluate the outcomes of the transitional justice process in East Timor in the light of these 
different approaches, and at the same time assess the empirical validity of the claims they set 
out. The analysis of the consequences of the transitional justice measures in chapters four and 
five will therefore be viewed in relation to these different approaches. 
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3. What factors explain why the process of transitional justice 
has become more reconciliatory than judicially focused? 
 
To answer the first research question, an examination of attitudes of the parties that have been 
of importance for East Timor’s transitional justice process is necessary. These parties are 
Indonesia, the international community, especially the UN, the US and other important 
regional neighbours such as ASEAN-states, and lastly the East Timorese themselves. What 
have been their positions towards legal accountability for past atrocities in East Timor, and 
what has shaped these positions? This chapter will start by analysing the Indonesian attitude 
to accountability for past human rights violations, how and why this is shaped, before the 
position of the international society is discussed. Lastly, building on the preceding sections it 
will be analysed why the East Timorese have favoured a more reconciliatory than judicially 
focused approach.  
 
3.1 The Indonesian position 
Ever since the aftermath of the 1999-violence, when calls for an international tribunal rose 
from the international society, the official Indonesian response has been negative. As such the 
greatest political obstacle to the pursuit of justice for past human rights violations in East 
Timor has been Indonesia’s refusal to seriously support any such process. This has 
undermined all judicial initiatives taken to address past atrocities in East Timor, both the Ad 
Hoc Court in Jakarta and the Serious Crimes process in East Timor. As will be outlined later, 
the Indonesian position has also had great repercussions for how the international community 
and the East Timorese themselves have chosen to deal with the past. It is therefore relevant to 
ask what has driven this attitude, and why it is so hard to change or challenge?  
 
To answer this, it is necessary to look at the historical and political context, and elaborate on 
the dominant position of the military. The military has since Suharto occupied a strong 
position in Indonesia. Based on the doctrine of dwifungsi – dual function, TNI interference in 
political issues was justified by viewing the military’s role as external and internal guarantor 
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of security and stability, and as a legitimate internal actor in socio-political affairs.62 This 
bestowed the TNI with a dominant influence, if not control over Indonesian politics. The TNI 
was for a long time by law guaranteed 100 seats in the main legislative chamber, and both 
active and retired officers filled posts in civil administration, the cabinet, and in state 
corporations.63 Both long reigning Suharto and the current president Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono belonged to the cadre of TNI officers.  
 
The military influence on society steered not only policy but also history-writing. Due to the 
military dominance the history of Indonesian occupation of East Timor has been portrayed 
quite differently in Indonesia than in the rest of the international society. For Indonesia, 
invasion and occupation of East Timor in 1975 has been depicted as a real-political necessity. 
The military was frightened by the communist aspects of the East Timorese political party 
FRETIILIN. Fearing that an independent East Timor could serve as a springboard for 
destabilisation and communist subversion of Indonesia, they were able to convince Suharto 
that integration of East Timor was essential to protect Indonesian stability and sovereignty.64 
After annexation, East Timor was looked upon as Indonesia’s rightful property whose 
incorporation into Indonesia had to be protected. This was also highly symbolic, in order to 
prevent a ‘Balkanisation’ of Indonesia if East Timor was to break away. The repressive sides 
of the invasion and occupation were concealed or styled to fit the national interest. The 1999-
violence is most often explained as infighting between different East Timorese factions, while 
some colourful accounts blame UN and Australian involvement.65 The TNI are accused for 
failing to stop the conflict, but are not recognised as being responsible for it. This historic 
interpretation is widely held in Indonesia, but does not correspond to the truth.66 
 
Since the fall of Suharto, Indonesia has been in a process of democratisation. The military 
grip on governmental institutions and policy is intended to be phased out via reforms. 
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However, this has met opposition from hard-liners both within the military and civilian 
administration, and the process has moved slowly. Furthermore, civilian politicians have 
tended to become enmeshed in internal power struggles, leaving the military to enforce 
supremacy.67 Lastly, as many retired TNI officers have continued to move to political parties 
and occupy important positions, the line between the civil administration and the military is 
still blurred. So though their power has decreased, Indonesia’s military have remained an 
influential element of Indonesian society.   
 
The attempts to hold former TNI personnel legally responsible for human rights violations in 
East Timor have been hampered by this military-political confluence. The issue has also been 
heavily politicised in Indonesia, with moderate reform willing politicians who welcome 
accountability as a step in the process of democratisation, and conservative nationalists who 
strongly oppose it.68 The civilian presidents since Suharto – Jusuf Habibie, Abdurraham 
Wahid and Sukarnoputri Megawati – though they have been pro-reform, have been easy 
targets for accusations of selling out the national interest if they try to adopt any policy 
detrimental to the military’s interest. The pursuit of legal accountability has also been 
hampered by valid concerns that pushing the military too much can lead to retributions and 
possibly endanger the still fragile democratisation process.69 Therefore, the Indonesian 
administrations after Suharto have to a large extent accommodated to TNI preferences on the 
issue of accountability for past violations in East Timor. Calls from the international society 
and NGOs to pursue legal justice has generally been met by a negative response. By 
reasoning that the accused human rights transgressions had taken place when East Timor was 
still, according to the official Indonesian version, a part of Indonesia – it has been 
characterised as internal events.70 On this basis, Indonesia has strongly rejected any idea of an 
international tribunal, arguing that it is a matter under national jurisdiction. Still the 
Indonesian government seems to have been mindful of possible negative effects of complete 
non-cooperation with the international society. As a result, Indonesia’s policy to the issue can 
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be characterised as doing just enough to satisfy the demands from the most critical 
international partners, without going as far to provide a proper legal process of 
accountability.71 The process surrounding the establishment of the Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta, 
which will be outlined later in this thesis, illustrates this argument. 
 
3.2 The position of the international community 
As the UN directly controlled East Timor from February 2000 to May 2002 the power of 
external actors over the transitional justice process was extensive. The UNTAET mandate 
gave the transitional administration unprecedented authority over East Timor, bordering 
towards sovereignty.72 Afterwards, the international community’s attitude has still been 
influential due to East Timor’s weak position in terms of power and influence. However, the 
position of the international society on how to address past atrocities in East Timor has been 
ambiguous. Geopolitical concerns and self-interest have dominated preferences, resulting in a 
disinclination to pressure Indonesia for justice.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the atrocities in 1999, the call for justice was widespread 
among the world’s nation-states. The violence connected to the referendum became the 
subject of condemnation by two UN Security Council resolutions that called for investigations 
into the issue of human rights violations and stressed accountability for perpetrators.73 
Simultaneously, as it came to the attention of the world community how grave human rights 
violations had taken place in East Timor since 1974, appeals for measures to address them as 
well naturally arose. Around September 24 to 27, 1999 the UN Commission on Human Rights 
convened a special session on East Timor, where it – despite protests from Indonesia – 
organised rapporteurs to visit the country and a UN Commission of Inquiry to be set up.74 The 
last time the UNCHR had initiated special sessions was in connection to the conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia in 1992 and 1993, and in Rwanda in 1994. On both occasions it had 
resulted in establishment of an international tribunal.75 The Commission of Inquiry and the 
rapporteurs recommended the same measure for this situation. They found it highly unlikely 
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that domestic prosecution would be fair and conform to international standards. The ability of 
Indonesia – which had produced these human rights violations for so many years and 
continued in other parts of the state such as Aceh and Papua – to confront own abuses was 
severely doubted.76 For these reasons, the UN Secretary General was firmly behind an 
international tribunal.77 It appeared to also have some support in the Security Council from 
notably the UK and the US.78 However, as the situation normalised, the international support 
for such a measure waned. It was especially significant how Indonesia fiercely rejected any 
international involvement, and characterised the past as ‘internal events’. This made the 
international community and the UN hesitant of pressuring Indonesia to accept an 
international tribunal. 
 
Compared to the other situations where an international tribunal has been established – the 
former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda – Indonesia was in a much stronger position. It was shaken 
by the recent Asian financial crisis, but it was not shattered and divided by a civil war. 
Moreover, in addition to a general respect for Indonesian sovereignty, there were important 
geopolitical concerns that influenced the international community’s attitude. Indonesia is for 
several reasons a valued member of the world community that many would go to great lengths 
not to antagonise. It is the world’s sixth largest state by population. The state is economically 
important as a substantial oil producer and occupies a strategically vital position between the 
Pacific and Indian Ocean. In addition, Indonesia is often seen as the key to regional stability 
and peace, and there is apprehension that pressuring the state too much can have regional 
security implications.79  
 
Throughout the Suharto regime (1966-1998) the bonds between Indonesia and the Western 
world had been close. Suharto supported the West in their fight against communism and the 
West acquiesced and quietly aided Indonesian human rights transgressions through assistance 
to the military. The events of 1999 upset this alliance, but the most significant Western states 
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such as the US, the UK, Australia, and Japan were eager to re-establish positive relations with 
Indonesia for economic and strategic reasons. They were therefore reluctant to press for an 
international tribunal. Russia and China, two other important states whose approval is crucial 
for the UN Security Council to establish an international tribunal, were also little inclined to 
support the idea, apprehensive that this could lead to similar attention towards their policies in 
Chechnya and Tibet.80 The member states of ASEAN have for similar reasons not been 
predisposed to support pressures for Indonesia to agree hold an international tribunal. They 
have in general been concerned over what they see as interventionist policies from Western 
states. They worry that allowing international intrusion into domestic affairs can become a 
precedent for future erosion of their sovereignty. They have also been fearful of alienating the 
alliance’s most important member, Indonesia.81 On the basis of this reasoning any 
international tribunal for the East Timorese-Indonesia situation would not have been 
supported. 
 
The decision by the world community and the UN to not initially press for an international 
tribunal also hinged on President Wahid’s seemingly credible promise to prosecute internally. 
There was optimism concerning the Indonesian democratisation process both in the 
international community and in East Timor.82 Moreover, there was hesitance to pressure the 
Indonesian government out of fear of the TNI reacting and the democratisation process 
backfiring.83 Considering the staggering costs connected to the earlier ad hoc tribunals for 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the UN was also hesitant as there was general donor 
fatigue. 84 Therefore, when the Indonesian government promised it would take responsibility 
to hold perpetrators accountable internally the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan decided to 
support prosecutions on the national level instead of an international court.85 Indonesia 
established the Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (SRSG) – head of the UNTAET, Sergio Vieira de Mello proceeded to set up an 
internal judicial mechanism for East Timor – the Serious Crimes Process (SCP). 
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As will be outlined later, the Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta became widely recognised as an 
unsatisfactory process of justice, not following international standards and not providing 
accountability. As Indonesia also refused to cooperate with the Serious Crimes Process in 
East Timor, it was clear that national prosecution would not produce justice in this case. Due 
to the gravity of the crimes committed in East Timor, and the principle of complementarity, it 
can be argued that the international society has an obligation to ensure prosecution of the 
serious crimes committed in East Timor, as the two states directly involved have shown 
themselves unwilling and unable to do so.86 However, Indonesia has continued to insist that 
the Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta was a legitimate and fair process of justice.87 Any later calls for 
additional legal prosecutions, especially by way of an international tribunal, have been 
rejected. The Indonesian government has also actively lobbied against an international 
tribunal. It has received support from the US Bush-administration, with its principled stand 
against international jurisdiction.88 The US position is complex however, as many 
congressmen favour more pressure for accountability and an international tribunal. It remains 
to be seen whether the Obama-administration can produce change on this issue. Until now, 
the most important external actors such as the US, Australia and ASEAN have continued to 
cling to the non-confrontational approach towards Indonesia for geopolitical reasons. The 
September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the Bali bombing in 2000 notably turned the US 
and its partners focus from “soft” liberal issues to real-political concerns such as security.89 In 
the context of post 9/11, as the world’s largest Islamic nation, Indonesia obtained political 
significance as a potential Islamic ally for the West, and by offering an opportunity for the US 
to improve its image in the Muslim world.90 Though Indonesia has been dependent on the US, 
Japan and Europe for trade and military cooperation, there has also been concern that 
pressuring Indonesia too much can lead it to drift towards China.91 At the time of the worst 
violence in 1999, most of these states stopped military cooperation with Indonesia. Since then 
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however, this has gradually been resumed.92 Moreover, the most important external actors 
have also partly evaded responsibility by arguing that it is an internal matter for the two states 
involved, and as long as East Timor and Indonesia are not willing to pursue justice, they will 
not exert pressure.93  
 
3.3 East Timor - dilemmas of justice and reconciliation 
While the UNTAET mandate was broad, it poorly defined the issue of local participation in 
governance of the territory.94 However, the SRSG Vieira de Mello had been given wide 
freedom of action, and he was sensitive to local politicians and wanted to include them in the 
administration.95 This opened up for prominent domestic actors to play a significant role, even 
during UNTAET. In the post-conflict period, East Timor has had a valuable asset – strong 
leaders. Most notably, Xanana Gusmão, but also to a certain extent José Ramos-Horta, have 
been central figures in the nations first ten years. Charismatic, intelligent and a shrewd 
guerilla fighter, Gusmão has been a front figure of the East Timorese resistance since the mid-
1980s. Imprisoned in Jakarta from 1993 to 1999, he returned after Indonesia’s retreat 
immensely popular, with great de facto authority. He took up his leadership position of the 
former umbrella organisation for the resistance movement (CNRM/CNRT), and became head 
of the East Timorese legislature-style body under UNTAET, the National Council (NC).96 In 
May 2002 he was elected as East Timor’s first President (2002-2007) and has after that 
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occupied the position of prime minister. José Ramos-Horta similarly has drawn popular 
support from being a respected former member of the independence movement. He spent the 
Indonesian occupation in exile, serving as East Timor’s foreign minister, and was crucial in 
gathering international support for the nation. He became the foreign minister in the first 
government under Mari Alkatiri (2001-2006), and was appointed prime minister from June 
2006 to May 2007 by then President Gusmão. After elections in May 2007, he has been 
President of East Timor. Due to their popular support and occupation of vital formal 
positions, especially Xanana Gusmão, but also José Ramos-Horta, have in the post-conflict 
situation been East Timor’s most significant and influential politicians. The official East 
Timorese handling of the transitional justice process must in addition to the influence of the 
UN, be seen as strongly shaped by, and at times directly emanating from their political views.  
 
Both Gusmão and Ramos-Horta have taken a reconciliatory approach to past human rights 
abuses in East Timor. They have espoused strong support for reconciliatory measures, such as 
the two truth commissions, CRTR and CTF, and Gusmão has been an outspoken advocate of 
amnesty.97 They have also on several occasions declared that they will not support legal 
prosecution, specifically not an international tribunal.98 Their and other East Timorese 
leaders’ embrace of a reconciliatory approach can be seen to stem from mainly three different 
sources, personal principles and convictions, traditional East Timorese forms of justice and 
conflict resolution, and practical challenges and constraints.  
 
Principled perceptions on the concept of reconciliation must be seen as crucial for Xanana 
Gusmão’s attitude to transitional justice. Gusmão has emphasised peace and social harmony, 
and seemed convinced that only reconciliation can promote harmony and peace. He has 
described reconciliation as “a process of ‘overcoming what has happened and a process of 
forgiving each another mutually’”.99  He has further outlined how this is connected to peace 
by stating, “peace must derive from the peace of mind within each human being, between 
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individuals expressed in the solidarity between communities, expressed by tolerance within 
societies until it reaches the level of mutual respect between countries”.100 On this background 
he has argued that he is not against the concept of justice, but that East Timor needs “a 
reconciliation process whereby justice is meted out to perpetrators but which eschews 
revenge, resentment and hatred”.101 As he explains, if a perpetrator is sentenced to prison, 
without having reconciled with his former foes, he will walk out after the sentence is served 
and the conflict will still exist as the personal antipathy is still present.102 Therefore, in 
Gusmão’s opinion, legal justice must include or preferably be preceded by a process of 
reconciliation so that emotions of hatred and revenge are not left to fester – “without 
reconciliation there is no peace”.103 Gusmão has in line with the logic of the emotional 
psychology paradigm also emphasised dialogue and truth-seeking – he campaigned forcefully 
for a truth-commission after 1999 – to obtain social peace and reconciliation. 
 
Traditional methods of conflict resolution and justice can be seen to have influenced both 
political elite and grass-root approaches to transitional justice in East Timor.104 Despite long 
Portuguese rule and Indonesian occupation, East Timor remained largely unaffected by the 
respective ruler-states formal judicial system. Though superficially existing and utilised 
sporadically, the Indonesian system was not trusted and largely seen as corrupt. Many smaller 
offences and conflicts, such as domestic violence were not dealt with by this system. East 
Timor therefore retained its local practices for conflict resolution. Being a highly rural 
society, the local culture is highly ‘collectivistic’ – group values and preferences are 
prioritised over individual concerns. 105 It stresses social order and harmony. Concepts such as 
‘law’ and ‘crime’ does not exist, but there are notions of people ‘doing wrong’ and upsetting 
the social order.106 If a violation of social norms has taken place, a conflict resolution 
mechanism is utilised which aims to restore harmony and social stability. The method is 
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strongly consensus-oriented, the affected parties meet, and through discussions, agreement is 
reached. Depending on the seriousness of the violation these meetings revolve around the 
authority of the family head or local leaders. To restore the social order, it is usually agreed 
that the perpetrator has to be punished. Punishment commonly consists of compensation, also 
for serious offences as murder.107 However it should be noted that the goal of punishment is 
not directly to penalise the offender or compensate the victim, it is to re-establish the social 
order and harmony. The punishment alters the balance, the wrong is righted by 
complimentary action. However, social harmony is not complete without a final important act 
– reconciliation. The conflicting parties must conciliate, otherwise antagonism and tensions 
can live on and resurface later. This is obtained trough a symbolic, ritual-based ceremony, 
which gives closure to the conflict. The notion of shame is important for traditional conflict 
resolution. A violation of a social norm entails much shame for the perpetrator and his family. 
It is important to save face, and avoid obtaining a bad name. As a result there is great pressure 
to perform conflict resolution processes, and reconcile, only then can the shame be avoided.108 
With its great emphasis on consensus and reconciliation, this traditional method is essentially 
a form of restorative justice. It is a style of conflict resolution which has been essential in 
small communities with tightly knit social connections, where conflicts easily could bring 
about community disintegration. A non-confrontational approach has been needed so that 
social relations can be repaired and upheld.109 The vital components of this method – 
emphasis on non-confrontation, consensus, social harmony, and reconciliation has been 
influential for the transitional justice approach taken in East Timor. They can be recognised in 
viewpoints and in measures. Gusmão’s thinking on reconciliation and justice is very much in 
line with cultural traditions. The transitional justice measures proposed by Ramos-Horta and 
Gusmão, the border reconciliation meetings, the CRTR and the CTF that will be outlined 
later, also embody vital components of traditional justice and conflict resolution. 
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While principles and traditional methods of conflict resolution can be seen as underlying 
factors, real-political constraints and challenges have been the direct causes to a reconciliatory 
approach. Both Gusmão and Ramos-Horta are pragmatic politicians, who have emphasised 
reconciliation before justice for practical and political reasons. Gusmão, from his personal 
principles, seems convinced of the utility of reconciliation. For him it is the tool that can 
facilitate stability, development social justice and peace for East Timor.110 José Ramos-Horta 
has shared this attitude to a certain extent, but seems more influenced by the external 
constraints – lack of support from the UN and Indonesia. They seem not averse to the concept 
of justice, but argue that due to geopolitical restraints, and practical needs, reconciliation is 
necessary.  
 
The practical issues that have made these leaders embark on a reconciliatory approach can be 
divided into internal and external considerations. The most central external consideration is 
the relationship to Indonesia. Since independence one of the most determining foreign policy 
issues for East Timor has been the relations it managed to establish with Indonesia. Indonesia 
was, and still is one of the most significant external variables to East Timor’s internal 
stability, territorial integrity, economic growth and development. The benefits for East Timor 
of having positive and functional diplomatic interactions with Indonesia are important. 
 
The structural relationship between East Timor and Indonesia is characterised by great 
asymmetry. Indonesia is a large state, rich on crucial resources and for the international 
society a valuable ally in many aspects. East Timor is a small state, for most other nations 
strategically, politically and economically insignificant. Though the economy is slowly 
growing, GDP per capita for 2008 was estimated to be around USD 2,500, placing East Timor 
among the poorest countries in the world.111 The pressing poverty gives dramatic 
consequences, hunger and malnourishment is rife, starvation has been a not uncommon cause 
of death.112 Furthermore, the state has little administrative capability and infrastructure, while 
unemployment is high. Though formally estimated to around 40 per cent, in rural areas it can 
be as high as 80 per cent.113 There is potential for future economic expansion in East Timor 
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based on tourism and agribusiness, and from extraction of oil and gas resources from the 
Timor Gap.114 However, East Timor has since independence been critically dependent upon 
external help such as aid and positive trading relationships with other states in order to subsist 
and to increase own development and growth.115  
 
After de-integration Indonesia had the potential of being a crucial trade partner and food-
supplier for the newly independent East Timor. A non-cooperative relationship to Indonesia 
would have been very destructive for economic, defence and political reasons. Indonesia 
could have restricted access to East Timor, and obstructed the trade and development that East 
Timor is completely dependent on. Though the Indonesian government seems resigned to the 
fact that East Timor is an independent state, an ill-disposed Indonesia would have posed a 
threat to territorial integrity.116 The strong neighbour was easily capable of destabilising East 
Timor, with continued support to pro-Indonesian militia, cross-border incursions or 
restrictions on sea and air access.117 Moreover, for East Timor to gain from the opportunities 
of regional support and cooperation from ASEAN, a good relationship to Indonesia would be 
necessary.  
 
As calls for legal accountability for past crimes in East Timor have generally been met with 
fierce hostility in Indonesia, it has been an issue with the potential of seriously disrupting 
bilateral-relations. For a nation so critically dependent upon having a positive relationship 
with its closest neighbour – to press for justice would not have been politically constructive. 
East Timor’s security, economy and development would be critically at stake. This has been 
one of the main facets of East Timor’s transitional justice dilemma. Though legal justice is 
desired, so is a good relationship to Indonesia.  
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A further external consideration has been the international community’s position. The waning 
support for an international tribunal in the aftermath of 1999 was quickly noticed by East 
Timorese politicians, who realised that they could not expect support from crucial third 
parties if they chose to push the issue. The outcome might be an East Timor left alone to face 
a hostile Indonesia. Both Xanana Gusmão and José Ramos-Horta have been highly 
apprehensive of these external constraints and have chosen to accommodate after them. Both 
have been clear that East Timor’s economic development, security, and political stability are 
dependent upon strengthening cooperation with its neighbouring state.118 This has led to a 
general attempt to obtain as cooperative and positive relations with Indonesia as possible. 
Specifically, this has influenced their approach towards past human rights abuses and made it 
highly reconciliatory. Examples are their reiterated statements emphasising the significance of 
a good relationship to Indonesia and rejecting an international tribunal, Gusmão’s critique of 
SCU’s indictment of Indonesian officers, and his warm embrace of Indonesian military 
general Wiranto.119   
 
Internally, after Indonesian withdrawal there were many potential conflict-lines in East 
Timorese society. Some of these concerned structures that were created during Portuguese 
and the Indonesian occupation, such as competition and discord between state and church 
authorities, different regional groups, different linguistic groups (Indonesian vs. non-
Indonesian speaking), and centre-periphery conflict.120 Above all, a crucial challenge was the 
legacy of antagonism between pro-integration and pro-independence groups.121 Both before 
and during the Indonesian occupation there had been conflict between these groups, and 
within them. As a part of classic divide and conquer strategy, these axes of hostility were 
encouraged and exacerbated by the Indonesian military.122 Some escalated into violent clashes 
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where human rights violations where committed on all sides.123 After 1999, there was a 
glaring need to resolve these antagonisms and hostility of the past if East Timor was to 
function as an independent state. This was recognised by both the UNTAET administration 
and Gusmão. Both saw reconciliation as necessary to ensure domestic political stability that 
again could lead to development and peace.124  
 
An important part of this was the need to deal with still active and violent pro-integration 
groups to hinder future conflict. In the first years after 1999, the situation on the border 
between East Timor and Indonesian West Timor was still tense. Pro-integration militias from 
1999 were still active in West Timor, and undertook minor border incursions.125 The militias 
were also able to control some refugee camps, preventing the around 200,000 refugees who 
had been forcibly displaced to return to East Timor.126 In addition, East Timorese who had 
participated in the Indonesian administration had sought refuge in West Timor as well as 
other former pro-integrationists who had not been so active. These groups numbered around 
100,000 people, most of whom were afraid to return out of fear of retaliation and revenge by 
their former communities.127 Though there was a desire to put the perpetrators of crimes in 
this group to justice, it was also important to reintegrate these individuals back to their former 
communities in a way that could prevent future conflict. A legal process would not facilitate 
this. To the contrary, the threat of prosecution held many back from returning. Xanana 
Gusmão quickly recognised these problems, and chose to let them guide the response to the 
situation rather than to push for prosecution. He argued that reconciliatory measures had to be 
made to both to spur these people to return, and to hinder later conflict and social 
instability.128  
 
A last internal pragmatic consideration that has weighed the pendulum towards a 
reconciliatory approach is more self-serving, and building on a culture of informal bonds of 
collegiality that are strong in East Timor. As mentioned earlier, during the occupation, East 
                                                 
123
 “Chega!”, 149-153. ; This is a fact that is often greatly exaggerated in Indonesian press and politics. Though 
East Timorese did commit atrocities, it must be stressed that the majority of human rights violations were the 
responsibility of the Indonesian military, both directly, and indirectly in that much of the intra-Timorese violence 
was fomented by the TNI. 
124
 Gusmão, “Volunteerism”, 81.; Xanana Gusmão “Challenges”. 
125
 Dunn, East Timor, 373. 
126
 Ibid., 373.; Joseph, Oenarto, “Can East Timor Survive Independence”, North Australia Research Unit 
Discussion Paper, Australian National University (ANU), 17, 2000, 17. 
127
 Tim Johnson, “Anti-independence leader apologises to East Timor’s Gusmão”, Kyodo News, June 15, 2000. 
128
 Dodd, ”Gusmão and Belo”.; Gusmão, “Considering a Policy”, 114. 
~ 37 ~ 
 
Timorese on all sides of the conflict committed human rights crimes. Gusmão was himself at 
a period in charge of a battalion with a particularly brutal reputation. So his, reconciliatory 
stance has possibly also in part originated from a fear of himself or other former colleagues 
from the former resistance movement being implicated in a legal process.129 He has stated 
how he “will not accept the possibility of a Timorese becoming a possible defendant in the 
international tribunal”.130 This attitude has to a certain extent been shared by other East 
Timorese politicians, and can be seen as part of the reason some have favoured a 
reconciliatory approach to crimes committed between 1974 and 1999, but prosecution from 
1999 onwards. If an international tribunal was to be erected, with jurisdiction going from 
1974 to 1999 – as many want, then former members of the resistance could risk prosecution, 
and loss of freedom and career.  
 
For the reasons now mentioned, accountability for past human rights crimes is a sensitive 
issue in East Timorese politics. Reflecting the practical challenges, and personal experiences 
and preferences – a diverse line of policies have been advocated from the various political 
parties, from emphasising reconciliation, to supporting amnesty for crimes committed 
between 1974 and 1999 but prosecution from 1999, and to calls for prosecution for all crimes 
since 1974.131 However, Gusmão has been determined to let the past be the past, and focus on 
the future, and argues that future peace and development requires that reconciliation takes 
place before justice.132 Horta has joined Gusmão in criticising recommendations for 
international tribunals by pointing out that there is simply not sufficient international will in 
favour of such a measure.133 For their reconciliatory policies, they have been castigated by 
other politicians, the public, the church, NGO’s and the UN, who advocate prosecution from a 
legalist perspective.134 Still, it should be noted that many other East Timorese politicians’ 
thoughts on how to address past atrocities have also been strongly influenced by the 
aforementioned factors. Therefore, although most of the dominant parties support a process of 
justice, they have also chosen to support policies aimed at reconciliation. To promote a good 
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relationship to Indonesia has become gradually more a concern since 1999, as East Timor has 
progressed from a conflict to a post-conflict situation.  As the world community and the UN 
also revealed that they were not willing to unequivocally support measures of legal 
accountability, it reduced the scope of available measures, pushing many towards a more 
reconciliatory line.135 Significantly, before the last parliamentary elections in 2007, all of the 
political parties announced that they supported cooperative relations with Indonesia on the 
basis that it would further trade and security interests.136  
 
3.4 Summary 
The process of transitional justice in East Timor has been more reconciliatory than judicially 
focused due to external constraints, and internal challenges and preferences. The military-
political confluence in Jakarta has been the most fundamental hindrance to the pursuit of legal 
accountability for the most serious crimes. In addition the international community’s 
disinterested attitude to justice has been influential. This made the stakes high for East Timor, 
and the East Timorese political elite decided to emphasise a good bilateral relationship rather 
than to push for justice. Domestically, there have also been several challenges that rigid 
pursuit for justice could have exacerbated. As such, there seems to have been numerous well-
founded pragmatic and political reasons for the East Timorese choice of a reconciliatory 
policy. 
 
It can be noted that the position of Indonesia, the international society, and partly also the East 
Timorese elite towards justice for past atrocities in East Timor therefore follows in the lines of 
the pragmatist paradigm. Though there have been appeals to justice by legalist reasoning, 
geopolitical and internal political concerns have steered the process of transitional justice, 
making it more focused on reconciliation than justice. Power, or lack of power, and the self-
interest of the actors have largely determined their attitudes and actions. Both domestically 
and externally for East Timor, political and prudential concerns would have collided with 
justice, and therefore reconciliatory policies were chosen. In addition, the emotional 
psychology paradigm can be seen to have had some influence on certain members of the East 
Timorese political elite, most notably Xanana Gusmão.  
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4. Consequences of judicial measures 
In order to establish legal accountability for past crimes two tribunals have been held, a 
national tribunal in Jakarta, and a hybrid tribunal for East Timor. However, despite these 
efforts, legal justice has not been fulfilled. Both tribunals failed to hold perpetrators of the 
most serious crimes accountable, and in the cases they did try, international standards of law 
were transgressed. How did this happen, and what were the consequences? This chapter will 
first analyse how, and then discuss the consequences. The latter discussion will in particular 
question the validity of the legalist paradigm and the utility of trials as measures to deal with 
past atrocities. The reasons for the failure of the tribunals will be outlined somewhat in detail 
as this is of importance for the ensuing discussion. 
 
4.1. The Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta 
In September 1999 the Indonesian Human Rights Commission (KOMNAS HAM) set up the 
National Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP HAM). It 
was mandated to gather information and determine whether serious human rights violations 
had occurred between January 1 and October 25, 1999.137 Although this seemed like a 
significant step towards accountability, it must be pointed out that there was significant 
pressure from the world community for international investigation and prosecution. The 
internal self-scrutiny should therefore be seen as emanating largely from external influences, 
with aims of preventing an international investigation.138 
 
KPP-HAMs final report from January 2001 concluded that there was evidence that crimes 
against humanity had taken place, in the form of a scorched earth campaign, mass murder, 
torture, disappearances, sexual violence against women and children, forced displacement and 
property destruction.139 It also established that there was a strong relationship of cooperation 
between East Timorese militias, Indonesian military and the Indonesian government. The 
Indonesian civilian administration, military and police force had aided the militias in creating 
conditions that supported crimes against humanity, and these crimes had been perpetrated by 
both the militias, the military, the police and civil authorities. It stated that “it strongly 
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indicates a planned, systematic, wide-scale and gross violation of human rights.”140 The report 
named 33 suspected perpetrators, both Indonesian public officials and militia leaders, and 
recommended that a court should be established to prosecute these.  
 
Though it did only cover the events around the referendum in 1999, the KPP-HAM report was 
significant as it was internationally seen as accurate and reliable. The only exception was in 
Indonesia, where the findings of the report were criticised and the neutrality of members of 
the Committee was questioned by Parliament.141 The Indonesian government did 
nevertheless, to satisfy immense pressure from the world community, follow up on its 
recommendation and established the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court on Timor-Leste in Jakarta 
with assistance from the UN. It began operating in March 2002.142  
 
The proceedings in this court can be characterised as “show trials” however. Jon Elster’s 
separation of political and legal justice is useful to describe the process.143 According to 
Elster, legal justice occurs when the laws are unambiguous, the judiciary is not influenced by 
other government departments, judges and jurors are unbiased and the trials follow due 
process.144 Conversely, a trial will lean towards political justice the more it lacks these 
characteristics. Typically, in a case of political justice the ruling elite will be able to 
predetermine the outcomes unilaterally. The Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta was a clear example of 
political justice. The trials had an outside appearance of legality, but in substance the 
outcomes were determined by political factors. The process was clearly politicised, and a lack 
of political will in the high levels of the Indonesian government and the Attorney General’s 
office to prosecute suspected perpetrators made the outcome hollow. International standards 
of law were transgressed on several occasions, and the judiciary, especially judges and 
prosecutors were deeply prejudiced and acted under strong domination of political and 
military preferences. Ultimately the process did not hold any individual accountable for 
human rights crimes in East Timor.  
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The lack of political will to perform a credible process was demonstrated from the beginning, 
when the jurisdiction of the Court was limited temporally to only April and September 1999, 
and geographically to only three of East Timor’s thirteen districts by Presidential decree from 
Megawati.145 The exclusion of the 23 previous years of human rights violations was expected 
as the main pressure of the international community had been for legal accountability for the 
events of 1999. Notwithstanding, the decision to focus narrowly on separate incidents in 1999 
meant that the prosecutors also were hindered from providing a broader perspective of the 
context and how the crimes of 1999 were systematic and organised.  
 
Throughout the proceedings, the disinclination to prosecute thoroughly was again displayed 
several times, causing further breaches of international standards of law by both judges and 
prosecutors. Covering twelve trials, the court indicted eighteen defendants with background 
from the TNI, the police, the civilian administration and the militia. Of these, most were from 
lower ranks in the TNI, the high-level military officers mentioned as suspected perpetrators in 
the KPP-HAM were not indicted. Furthermore, despite the large amounts of available 
evidence, gathered by among others the KPP-HAM and UNTAET, the prosecution 
consistently refrained from pressing its case with credible and thorough information.146 The 
prosecutors did also not explore the relationship between the TNI, the paramilitary elements 
and the Indonesian government officials. It was not investigated whether TNI officers at the 
high command level were responsible for instigating the violence in 1999. The trials hence 
supported the common image in Indonesia of the events as conflicts between different East 
Timorese groups, who were acting without any support or orders from Indonesian 
institutions.147 The TNI had reacted to restore order, and the indicted were accused of failing 
to quell the violence. No responsibility on the high-command level in the TNI for organising 
the atrocities was acknowledged. It was a central failure of the tribunal that it failed to 
challenge this version of what happened in 1999, as it is contrary to all available evidence.  
 
                                                 
145
 Dili, Liquica and Kovalima.; Järvinen, “Human Rights”, 45; “Justice Denied for East Timor”, Human Rights 
Watch (HRW), December 20, 2002. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/04/19/tortured-beginnings 
146
 The most obvious illustration of the political interference in the process was the case of Adam Damiri. As the 
highest ranking TNI official to be sentenced, he received three years of imprisonment. However, the prosecutor 
had argued for an acquittal.; Cohen, “Intended to Fail” , vi, 14, 25-28. 
147
 Cohen, “Intended to Fail”, vi. 
~ 42 ~ 
 
Only six of the indicted were convicted of crimes against humanity with sentences ranging 
from three to ten years, a length which in some cases was far below the international 
minimum standards.148 The rest was acquitted. However, all of the convictions have later been 
overturned on appeal.149 Therefore, the Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta manifestly failed its purpose 
to establish accountability for high ranking perpetrators responsible for the worst human 
rights violations in East Timor. The process further served to whitewash suspected 
perpetrators, as the Indonesian government has since claimed that the trials were legitimate 
and adequate, and that no further legal process is necessary.150  
 
Though the fundamental reason for the tribunal’s failure to produce accountability was lack of 
political will to prosecute, there were underlying systemic and case-specific factors that 
exacerbated this predicament. A general systemic problem was that the jurisdictional sector in 
Indonesia has also fallen victim to military influence. The position as Attorney General (AG) 
belonged during Suharto’s rule almost exclusively to a TNI officer. Although the military 
hold is in process of being phased out, it was still present during the ad hoc tribunal. As 
Cohen describes, both the Attorney General’s office and the Public Prosecutor’s Service 
(PPS) were characterised by a military-hierarchical culture.151 Prosecutors wore military 
uniforms, and performed military rituals, lower officers were not expected to speak when 
superiors were present. There was little room for individual thinking and initiative. 
Performance and advancement was evaluated on the basis of loyalty and cooperation with 
orders from above, not professional skills. There was an expectation that the PPS, as an arm 
of the state, had as its main task to serve the government’s political interest, not the law.152 
Because of this culture in the jurisdictional sector, it was not necessary with specific orders 
from the high political level for the subsidiary organs to operate according to the political 
interest. The system was such that lower ranks on all levels would be sensitive to preferences 
of superiors, and act accordingly as this was what was expected to give rewards.153 This 
unquestioning culture of loyalty makes it difficult to determine individual responsibility for 
the failing of the trials. However, as all actions will be determined by the predispositions of 
the elite, Cohen notes, “it is beyond dispute that the ultimate responsibility [resided] at the 
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highest levels of the AG’s office and in the failure of political will in Megawati’s 
government”.154  
 
There were also case-specific problems. The PPS was not given sufficient resources. There 
was inadequate witness protection, and throughout the trials, the judges were constantly 
subject to harassment and intimidation by members of the TNI who where present in the 
courtroom. However, both these and the aforementioned structural problems could have been 
defeated, had there been political determination on the top to pursue accountability. A last 
case-specific problem that would have been harder to overcome was the unfamiliarity of the 
Indonesian judicial system to deal with this type of cases. Prosecutors and judges had little 
experience in dealing with international human rights law and minimal professional 
competence on the area.155 Moreover, the Indonesian prosecutors were not accustomed to 
opposing other parts of the state administration. Lastly, the Indonesian view of the events of 
1999 was so entrenched that in many of the proceedings it was shared by the accused, the 
witnesses, the defence council, the judges and the prosecution.156  
 
4.2 The Serious Crimes Process (SCP)  
After the UNSG had decided on prosecution on a national level, a hybrid tribunal in East 
Timor was established by UNTAET regulation in 2000. It had three components: the Serious 
Crimes Unit, the Special Panel of Judges and the Public Defender’s Office – that can 
collectively be referred to as the Serious Crimes Process (SCP).157 The Serious Crimes Unit 
(SCU) consisted of UN civilian police that were tasked with investigation and prosecution of 
grave offenses committed during the violent period in 1999.158 It was wholly staffed and 
funded by the UN.159 The Special Panels of Judges comprised of three panels of judges, each 
with two international and one East Timorese judge, all funded by the UN.160 The panels had 
jurisdiction over the serious crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed at any time; and in addition the crimes of murder, torture and sexual violence 
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committed between January 1 and October 25, 1999.161 The Public Defenders Office was 
responsible for minor and grave offenses, and was almost wholly funded and staffed by the 
East Timorese. 162  
 
This blend of national and international elements is a defining feature of the hybrid tribunal. 
Also denoted as the mixed court model – it is a recent development in the field of transitional 
justice.163 Both in institutional composition and concerning the law that is applied it is a 
combination of national and international elements. It is normally located within the national 
territory, but operating with significant international backing and assistance. Theoretically, it 
has the potential of being an optimal solution to delivering justice for international crimes. It 
is close to the people concerned and can be more meaningful than an international tribunal. It 
involves the local population which increases its legitimacy and public support, while the 
international involvement provides resources and can ensure that due judicial standards are 
upheld. International participation also gives an aura of independence over the tribunal, which 
can enhance its legitimacy domestically and internationally. As skilled international jurists 
work with domestic jurists, it can increase the competence in the local judicial sector. 
Moreover, the mix of international and local involvement can help spread norms of 
international humanitarian laws through networks of information-sharing and interaction 
between locals and international staff. Lastly, the hybrid court model gives justice quick and 
for less cost. They usually operate for a much shorter time and are far less expensive than 
international courts.164 
 
UNTAET decided on this model for East Timor as the local judicial system was virtually non-
existent after Indonesia’s retreat in 1999. All legal infrastructure such as archives, books and 
other judicial facilities had been completely destroyed as a part of the scorched earth 
campaign by the TNI. The few individuals who had participated in the judicial sector under 
Indonesian rule had fled the country. There were approximately sixty people with law degrees 
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left, but only one had any judicial experience.165 As the UN had ruled out the option of an 
international tribunal, it was still acknowledged that a certain degree of international support 
and participation was needed to ensure prosecution after due standards in East Timor. In 
addition it was thought that the experiences of the hybrid court could be a learning measure 
for the East Timorese judicial sector that could strengthen the national judiciary. 
 
However, the hybrid tribunal was not as successful as many had hoped. Its theoretical 
justifications failed to materialise, and particularly, the tribunal did not achieve its most 
important task, to establish accountability for the serious human rights violations of the past. 
The primary reason for the failure to produce accountability must be attributed to Indonesia’s 
refusal to cooperate. This made proper prosecution impossible. While the secondary reasons 
for the tribunal’s fiasco can be attributed to several factors, the insufficient will of the 
international community, the UN, and the East Timorese government to make the pursuit of 
justice a main priority was clearly a significant cause. This was a consequence of 
reconciliation being valued over justice for geopolitical reasons. Indonesia’s attitude 
conditioned the East Timorese government, the international society and the UN from 
pressuring the issue. As such the political sensitivity of the situation and political concerns 
were instrumental for the tribunal’s failure.  
 
The SCP lasted till May 20, 2005. By that time 55 cases had been tried and 84 people had 
been convicted.166 Despite the large number of cases tried, most of the convicted were only 
low level perpetrators as minor East Timorese militia leaders.167 The SCU indicted 395 
defendants, but over 300 of these were outside the geographical jurisdiction of the tribunal.168 
75 per cent of the indicted were in Indonesia.169 A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
had been signed between UNTAET and Indonesia in April 2000 that provided for cooperation 
in judicial matters. It specifically required each party to hand over suspects for prosecution if 
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asked to, but Indonesia did not adhere.170 This was the largest obstacle to produce 
accountability for past human rights violations as the persons most responsible for the worst 
crimes were able to escape prosecution by staying in Indonesia. 
 
While the SCP’s main problem was lack of Indonesian compliance, the attitude of the UN and 
the East Timorese government exacerbated its difficulties. Both the SRSG for UNTAET, 
Sergio Vieira de Mello, and SRSG for UNMISET, Kamalesh Sharma, were receptive to East 
Timorese political leaders’ nervousness over their country’s relationship to Indonesia, and to 
the international community’s hesitance to antagonise Indonesia. Therefore, concerns 
regarding the potential destabilisation of the south-east Asian political balance, and the future 
relationship between East Timor and Indonesia, made the SRSGs hesitant to pressure for 
justice.171 The SRSG and the East Timorese decision to value the relationship with Indonesia 
resulted in actions directly restraining and undermining the SCP. Concerning extradition, 
UNTAET could have put pressure on the Indonesian authorities to comply, but chose not to. 
The East Timorese government obstructed issuing international arrest warrants.172 It also 
constantly attempted to lobby the Prosecutor-General to not “push too hard on the 
Indonesians”.173 There are indications that in the beginning, SCU investigations were 
conducted in a way that would specifically hinder implication of high-ranking Indonesian 
officials.174  
 
Moreover, as the geopolitical circumstances gave the UN and the East Timorese government 
little incentives to prioritise justice, the SCP suffered from a general lack of commitment, 
which became a significant undermining factor.175 One of the most pressing problems for the 
SCP was inadequate resources and funding. This stemmed not from lack of donors, but from 
unwillingness of both UNTAET and the later East Timorese government to allocate money to 
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this sector.176 Though the East Timorese unwillingness partly came from cultural reasons, it 
can also be attributed to the geopolitical sensitivities.177 As a result, the East Timorese 
Ministry of Justice repeatedly turned down offers of generous financial support to the SCP.178 
The UN on the other hand revealed its lack of commitment by paying scant attention to ensure 
proper funding and qualified staffing of the units. Had the government and the UN really been 
committed to a thorough judicial process, the necessary resources and attention could have 
been distributed to this project. Instead, available personnel were sharply insufficient. Crucial 
judicial and administrative such as secretaries and translators were missing. Important 
physical resources such as transport facilities, internet, library and work spaces were also not 
available.179 The repercussions were grave. The ability to conduct proper and thorough 
investigations was limited. As the selection-criteria for international judges were insufficient 
to provide competent personnel, the quality of jurisprudence was limited. The decision to 
make the Public Defenders Office entirely staffed by East Timorese might have had noble 
motives, but they were completely inexperienced. As there were no court stenographers or 
transcribers available for the first trials, no transcripts exist for these defendants to base 
appeals on, a grave breach of UNTAET regulation and international judicial standards. The 
right to an adequate defence was therefore seriously compromised for some of the 
prosecuted.180 Insufficient numbers of certified interpreters created serious communication 
problems and sometimes also serious mistakes. It led to trials being interrupted and delayed, 
and witnesses having to repeat statements of traumatic events several times.181 In sum, the 
lack of resources severely impeded the standard of the judicial processes.   
 
In addition, the capacity building programs intended to increase the skills of the local jurors 
also greatly suffered from inadequate provision of resources, and lack of support and 
attention. The UN administration down-prioritised this section from the beginning; emphasis 
was not put on mentoring and transferring of skills.182 Lack of interpreters made 
communication and learning difficult. Moreover, international staff were reported to have 
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behaved derogatory to local personnel. As a consequence the capacity building programs 
largely failed, and in some cases actually contributed to greater tension between East 
Timorese and UN personnel.183   
 
The unwillingness of the UN and the government to provide resources and commitment to the 
process also produced political uncertainty for the institutions future. Together with high staff 
turn-over, this hindered proper planning, institutional efficiency and moral.184 It also led to a 
strict time frame that limited the extensiveness of cases. Combined with a lack of planning it 
led to a poorly organised prioritisation of cases. Fair and consistent prosecution was missing. 
A central flaw was how investigation and prosecution focused on the 1999 violence and in 
comparison paid very little attention to the grave human rights violations committed before 
1999. Although the Special Panels were given jurisdiction to judge cases involving war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity committed at any time, a decision was made in 
2000 to only prioritise crimes from 1999.185 This policy-decision was ultimately a result of 
limited commitment and resources.186 It was severely criticised by several East Timorese 
politicians, NGO’s and victims, who pointed out how the violence in 1999 only made up less 
than 1 per cent of the total number of deaths.187 The decision to treat crimes from 1999 
thoroughly resulted in hundreds of indictments, but mostly of only low-level perpetrators. The 
inconsistency was glaring. While the high-level perpetrators were able to avoid prosecution in 
Indonesia, several low-level East Timorese perpetrators were prosecuted harshly.188 
Moreover, it meant that the large mass of East Timorese low-level perpetrators were not 
treated equally, some being prosecuted while others not.189 This naturally led to domestic 
criticism of partial justice and greatly weakened the credibility and public support for the 
tribunal.190  
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The prosecution strategy improved with the assumption of a new Deputy General Prosecutor, 
Siri Frigaard in late 2002. Several indictments of high-profiled Indonesian officers were 
issued, among them General Wiranto, in February 2003. However, then the lack of political 
support from both UNTAET and the East Timorese government was blatantly demonstrated, 
together with the problem of unclear ownership of the process. As the Indonesian government 
reacted angrily to the indictment and fiercely criticised the UN for political bias, the SRSG 
issued a statement stressing this was the act of the Prosecutor-General, not the UN.191 This 
disappointed many East Timorese and increased the perception that the UN was not credibly 
committed to pursue justice. Not long after however, the government also issued a similar 
declaration, relinquishing responsibility, stating the UN was responsible for the indictment, 
not East Timor. Gusmão and Ramos-Horta paid visits to Indonesia, stressing the primacy of 
good relationships over justice concerns. Gusmão specifically declared that he saw it “not of 
national interest to hold a legal process such as this one”.192 The political attitude ultimately 
reached the General Prosecutor (GP), who after the issuing of an arrest warrant for Wiranto in 
May 2004 did a volte-face and requested to have the indictment “revised”.193 This was 
rejected, but the GP subsequently refused to send a request for an international arrest warrant 
to Interpol.  
 
It was a significant illustration of the UN and the East Timorese government’s lack of will to 
support a thorough process of justice, that every time serious measures were taken both 
parties did their best to separate themselves from the tribunal. As Järvinen outlines, 
disassociation was made easy as the very nature of the establishment and structure of the 
mixed hybrid tribunal made it vulnerable to the problem of unclear ownership. Established by 
the UN of UNTAET regulations, the East Timorese leadership argued the SCP was an 
international responsibility.194 However, when East Timor became independent the authority 
over the SCP was officially transferred to the East Timorese government. Although the UN 
continued to fund and staff the agencies, UNMISET argued that the SCP was now an East 
Timorese responsibility.195 Though this was formally correct, it neglected the practical reality 
that the SCP was crucially dependent on UN support. UN control over the process was 
                                                 
191
 Hirst and Varney, “Justice Abandoned”, 25. 
192
 Xanana Gusmão, “Statement”, February 28, 2003. 
193
 Hirst and Varney, ”Justice Abandoned”, 26. 
194
 Järvinen, ”Human Rights”, 52. 
195
 Järvinen, ”Human Rights”, 53. 
~ 50 ~ 
 
demonstrated with the closing down of the process which occurred solely after UN decisions. 
After Security Council decision the SCP stopped operating in May 2005 – a date that clearly 
was premature, had the goal been to effectively pursue justice.196  
 
A last critical side of the SCP was the minimal attention given to community outreach. The 
SCP had no outreach program in the beginning, and information of the process came only 
through an NGO.197 This was later improved, some public reports were issued and a few 
information meetings were held, but still the lack of communication and infrastructure outside 
of the capital Dili meant that most of East Timor’s population had little access to information. 
As a consequence the rural population had very limited understanding of the process – many 
did not even know it existed. Those who did know supported the efforts to produce justice, 
but were critical of the tribunal’s shortcomings. Most criticised was the failure to hold the 
most serious perpetrators, the Indonesian officials and militia leaders accountable. The 
resulting concentration on East Timorese was as mentioned perceived as unfair. There was 
also dissatisfaction with the focus on 1999 exclusively, and the slow process of the tribunal.198 
 
In summary, the hybrid tribunal for East Timor contained serious flaws and must be 
considered unsuccessful. Most importantly it failed to achieve its main purpose - to establish 
legal accountability for the most serious crimes. The main reason for the tribunal’s problems 
was Indonesian non-cooperation, but also insufficient political support and commitment – 
mainly from UN and the East Timorese government.199 It did not operate according to 
international judicial standards. With its disproportional focus on 1999, and low-level East 
Timorese perpetrators, the tribunal did not promote fair and consistent rule of law. This 
severely undermined the public respect for the tribunal. Moreover, despite being physically 
closer to the people involved, the very nature of the tribunal made it easier for the government 
and the public to distance themselves from the tribunal. Capacity building was not achieved, 
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and the hybrid tribunal failed its potential of being a learning mechanism for the local 
population.200  
 
4. 3 The utility of justice through trials 
After these two attempts at obtaining legal accountability through trials largely failed, it can 
be asked – what is the utility of prosecutorial justice as a mechanism for dealing with past 
human rights violations? The following section will address this issue by first looking at the 
prospects for achieving a legalist version of justice in East Timor. How well can the different 
trial-options of national, hybrid and international courts really be expected to deliver the 
promises legalist scholars espouse? Secondly, it will be discussed how the lack of 
prosecutorial justice has impacted on East Timor. Specifically, does the lack of prosecutorial 
justice explain East Timor’s problems with crime and instability? The aim is to question the 
legalist tenets of justice producing peace and democracy. 
 
4.3.1 The prospect of achieving a legalist version of justice 
Firstly what are the prospects of achieving a legalist version of justice for past atrocities in 
East Timor through trials? This includes not only legal accountability as such, but a process of 
justice through trials promoting rule of law and peace, that would be meaningful for local East 
Timorese, and could help build domestic capacities?  
 
To review national options first, the Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta demonstrated that any national 
legal process in Indonesia is doomed to failure unless serious structural changes are made, and 
so far this has not happened. Similarly, the East Timorese legal system is still nascent and 
lacking in capacity. In the unlikely event that Indonesia would agree to cooperate and 
extradite, any domestic prosecution in East Timor would therefore not follow international 
standards. Most likely, the process would also be strongly politically determined. It can 
therefore be concluded that national prosecution would not produce genuine justice, and it 
would not contribute to any strengthening of rule of law.  
 
The opposition of the Indonesian government and the lack of international support have 
precluded any possibility of establishing an international tribunal. Also, though an 
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international tribunal is often called upon for East Timor, it can still be questioned whether it 
is an ideal solution. Although this thesis gives limited room to discuss this issue extensively, 
some obvious critical sides to this type of justice should be mentioned. International tribunals 
are expensive and distant from the people concerned. Dickinson argues that they are prone to 
have problems with legitimacy, as they are staffed with only foreign jurists, their abjudication 
is based on law that is usually not familiar domestically, and there is often little information 
given to the local population, creating misperception and dissatisfaction with the tribunal.201 
Further, she mentions how their physical distance from the state concerned and exclusion of 
locals in their work does little to build competence in the domestic judicial sector. This also 
hinders spread of norms asserting human rights and accountability for international crimes, as 
there are no networks or contacts between the jurists of the tribunals and domestic legal 
professionals.202 As Minow remarks, the ICTY and ICTR have so far not contributed much to 
improving the rule of law in their respective states.203 This greatly undermines the legalist 
claims of the educative function – strengthening of the rule of law, democratic and liberal 
values – prosecution by an international tribunal can have for East Timor. Moreover, the 
legalist claim of justice producing peace is also uncertain. The empirical basis for arguing that 
the international tribunals of ICTY and ICTR have contributed to reconciliation, and deterred 
and prevented atrocities is in fact slim. One of the worst massacres of the war on the Balkans 
in Srebrenica in 1995, took place after the ICTY was established.204 The ICTY trials over 
Milosevic increased ethnic and political strife in the former Yugoslavia.205 Similarly, several 
scholars have noted how the ICRT served to strengthen ethnic divisions in Rwanda, and has 
done little to further peacebuilding and national reconciliation as were its aims.206  
 
The hybrid tribunal in East Timor was a measure hoped to avoid the problems of distance and 
legitimacy. It would be close to the people, and could help build capacity and norm-spreading 
in the local judicial sector. The SCP has been heralded by the UN’s own Commission of 
Experts (COE) as an “effective and credible” process, “generally conformed to international 
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standards”, contributing to accountability, history-building, jurisprudence, rule of law.207 
While it can be given some credit for its achievement in accountability and truth-finding, it 
should be acknowledged that the UN COE’s glorified description does not match reality. As 
outlined, the SCP failed to live up to expected achievements of the hybrid tribunal, and failed 
to achieve central legalist aspirations. Therefore, the contributions of the SCP to strengthening 
justice and the people’s belief in institutions of justice has been minimal.208 It therefore seems 
like no national, international or a hybrid tribunal would be able to produce proper legalist 
version of justice for East Timor.  
 
4.3.2 The impact on lack of prosecution for East Timor 
As it is now established that attempts at legal prosecution did not provide justice, it is in its 
place to ask more specifically what the consequences of this have been for East Timor. The 
legalist paradigm touts the democratic and deterrent effects of criminal prosecution for past 
crimes. Diane Orentlicher has been among the most vocal, arguing that prosecution is 
essential to uphold rule of law, advance democracy and deter future atrocities. Especially 
weak societies in transition she argues will benefit from prosecutions.209 She posits a “duty to 
prosecute”, on these grounds. Most scholars and observers writing on East Timor follow her 
lines and argue that legal justice is vital to support respect for human rights, rule of law, and 
prevention of violence and conflict. At first glimpse it may seem as if they are right. East 
Timor has not seen legal accountability for the most serious crimes, and has obvious problems 
with crime and violence. Rule of law is weakly established in the territory. Locals take justice 
into their own hands, and violence is widely seen as a legitimate measure of dealing with 
conflict.210 Disturbingly, there are reports of corruption and grave human rights abuses by the 
police, such as torture, arbitrary detention and undue use of force.211 Moreover, sections of the 
military have frequently been hostile to the government and have acted beyond civilian 
control.212 There have been fierce conflicts both within and between the two security 
                                                 
207
 See excerpt from the Commission of Experts (2005) report in Reiger and Wierda, ”The Serious Crimes 
Process”, 41.; Hirst and Varney, “Justice Abandoned”, 30. 
208
 Reiger and Wierda, ”The Serious Crimes Process”, 41. 
209
 Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts”, 2540-2543. 
210
 Damien Kingsbury, “Timor-Leste: The Harsh Reality After Independence”, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2007, 
326.; Richard Curtain, “Crisis in Timor Leste; Looking for the Causes to Find Solutions”, Austral Peace and 
Security Network Policy Forum, July 31, (2006). 
211
 “Tortured Beginnings”, Human Rights Watch, 18, no. 2 (April 2006). http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/ 
04/19/tortured-beginnings.; “Timor-Leste: No Time for Complacency”, International Crisis Group (ICG), no. 
87, February 9, (2009). 
212
 Damien Kingsbury, “Timor-Leste”, 327. 
~ 54 ~ 
 
institutions. Organised violence and crime by gangs has also been a significant problem.213 
After independence there have been some serious episodes of internal violence and instability 
where both gangs, and elements from the police and the military have been among the main 
protagonists, (in 2006 and 2008 especially). Still, to what extent can these problems really be 
attributed to the lack of prosecutorial justice in the transitional justice process? 
 
Firstly, crime and social unrest, especially the violence in 2006 and 2008 must be seen against 
the backdrop of East Timor’s grinding poverty and unemployment which has served to 
worsen all social and political tensions.214 Secondly, the government can be criticised for 
having chosen a repressive policy towards political dissent, which has exacerbated grievances, 
and made violence the only option for aggrieved parties.215 Thirdly, most of East Timor’s 
security problems and instability has come from the security forces themselves. Empirical 
research on the security and justice sectors in East Timor therefore stress reforms of the 
security sector (the judiciary, police and military) as imperative to solve the problems 
connected to violence, instability and rule of law.216 The failure of the transitional justice 
process to provide prosecutorial justice is noted, but is not held this crucially responsible for 
the state’s problems. Rather, the causes for lacking rule of law and instability are traced back 
to the end of the Indonesian occupation, when the entire security sector, judiciary, police and 
military had to be constructed from scratch, and the UN grossly failed to provide adequate 
attention and resources to capacity building and the long-term viability of the institutions.217 
For example, UNTAETs police force, CIVPOL was made up of participants from 40 different 
countries, but minimal attention was paid towards coordination of their activities.218 Their 
professional quality varied, and many did not respect the rule of law. While this caused 
excessive use of force in some cases, the lack of resources also led to a hands-off approach in 
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others. CIVPOL officers did not have the skill or the will to demonstrate how a ‘democratic’ 
police force should be managed – and hence did not transfer skills to the local police. The 
police and military were both set up by controversial recruitment policies which marred them 
with conflicts within and between the institutions.219 The local judiciary was in dire need of 
capacity building and experience, but no clear political strategy for development of the 
judicial system was developed.220 Lastly, significant attention was not paid to how the 
informal traditional justice system interacted with the formal, and there were obvious tensions 
between these two forms of justice. In sum, the central problems were that there was little 
coordination among donors, and underestimation of the complexity of the task, and the 
resources and time needed to build new security and justice institutions.221 Hence unviable, 
conflicted institutions were created, lacking professional skills, marked by a culture of little 
accountability and civilian control. As Ronald E. West notes, the first reconstruction efforts 
therefore involved little but an “assembling of a justice bureaucracy”.222 Successive East 
Timorese governments can further be criticised for not having mended the problem. The 
research emphasises that the situation can only be altered by institutional reforms that address 
these underlying systemic causes for the problems. This includes reforms for capacity 
building in the judicial sector, and legal system reform to make legal institutions embedded in 
East Timorese society.223 Similarly the police and army need institutional reforms promoting 
professionalism, respect for the law and human rights, democratic accountability and control. 
Importantly, regulations must stress protection of citizens before the state.224 In terms of 
bringing forth improvement in democracy, rule of law and stability in East Timor this is what 
is emphasised – not legal prosecution for past crimes. 
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Concerning other cases of transitional justice, as with the international tribunals, William 
Schabas and Ramesh Thakur point out that there is so far no evidence confirming the effect of 
accountability for past crimes for deterring cycles of violence.225 Spain and Liberia are two 
notable examples where peace came without legal accountability. Moreover, Elizabeth Kiss 
emphasises that research has not provided any evidence that transitional justice processes 
significantly further democratisation, but rather institutional reforms of the judiciary, military 
and the police are most often seen as essential to democratic consolidation, supporting the 
aforementioned research on East Timor.226 Surveying case studies of post-conflict societies 
where past atrocities were to be addressed, as well as new systems of justice and security to 
be built, Charles T. Call concludes that even though scholars and others stress the link 
between justice for past atrocities and future systems of justice – the empirical evidence is 
lacking – “yet this limited collection of cases failed to establish a robust empirical connection 
between justice for past abuses and the quality and accessibility of justice in the future”.227 He 
also argues that the deficiencies of justice are more due to institutional and political decisions, 
and the context of war termination.  
It appears as if the legalist position overlooks that there can be a fundamental difference 
between establishing justice for past atrocities, and providing for a new system of justice. It 
should be acknowledged that the goals and measures used for the two issues are actually 
distinct. As Caitlin Reiger argues,  
“the demands of providing speedy, efficient and fair prosecutions in a post-conflict environment are 
often quite different from the demands of rebuilding a justice system. Building capacity takes 
significant time and patience, and necessarily involves some mistakes as well.”228   
While the call for justice for past atrocities is often imminent and quick measures are needed 
that can provide closure to victims and conflict, rule of law and democratic institutions are not 
quickly created. Often it is a longer process involving economic or cultural changes. In their 
report on traditional justice, Tanja Hohe and Rod Nixon emphasise how the local concepts 
and methods of justice and conflict resolution that are utilised by a majority of East Timorese 
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are on many accounts starkly different from the mainly western system of justice UNTAET 
and successive governments have tried to implement. While the western system is centred 
round the individual, and emphasises individual human rights, the traditional system asserts 
the value of the collective and social harmony.229 The conflict-resolution mechanisms utilised 
are – as described earlier – also completely different, and promotes compensation and 
reconciliation as a solution for all disputes, including serious crimes. Hohe and Nixon 
therefore argue that to succeed with implementation of a western system of justice will 
require a comprehensive transformation of social structures and “long-term commitment to 
the economic and industrial development of the country”.230 Considerable time and resources 
will be required.  
 
On the basis of this, it should be acknowledged that prosecutions for past atrocities in the East 
Timorese context cannot be expected to solely or significantly contribute to the rule of law. 
Call also supports this by arguing “hasty efforts to foster the rule of law in only a few years 
are futile, especially in poor, (…) societies with low degrees of institutionalization”.231  
 
All of this is not to say that justice for past atrocities is not important. It can still have a 
significant symbolic effect for victims, and the broader society. In the East Timorese context, 
it is often argued that victims need justice to reconcile. But, whether justice necessarily will 
lead to reconciliation is doubtful. Trials are as Minow remark, not aimed towards 
reconciliation, they are a confrontational approach to dealing with past atrocities. 232 To the 
extent that they can lead to acknowledgement and expression of remorse by perpetrator, the 
victim might be willing to forgive, but this is neither easy nor given.233 Nevertheless, in a 
favourable political context, where sufficient time and resources are provided, a hybrid 
tribunal can potentially contribute to both accountability and capacity-building. Moreover, a 
successful process of prosecution can promote domestic support for official justice systems.234 
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On the other hand, abortive and ineffective attempts can potentially undermine public trust in 
formal systems. The SCP was a combination of an unsuccessful project of prosecution with 
little attention to community outreach – which gave more impetus to the latter. More 
information on practical and political obstacles could have eased public criticism, and 
enhanced understanding and support for formal justice.  
 
Lastly, while this section has hitherto mainly focused on East Timor, the same arguments are 
valid for Indonesia as well. Indonesia has since Suharto’s fall been on the way to democracy, 
but has faced significant hurdles. The main challenge remains to break the military’s 
influence over political and civil life, and assert civilian control over the military. This 
requires change or eradication of the dwi-fungsi doctrine, and the territorial structure of the 
army.235 However, these are institutionally structured elements, and there is a consensus that 
significant institutional reform on many levels is necessary to effectuate Indonesia’s transition 
towards democracy. Accountability for past atrocities can be a part of the transition, but 
should not be expected to facilitate it. The analysis of the Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta illustrated 
how attempts at obtaining legal accountability were hampered due to the military-political 
confluence of all government sectors, and the militaristic culture in the judicial sector. The 
continued presence of these factors means that prospects are slim for any fair and meaningful 
process of justice for past crimes in any Indonesian court. Other trials in Indonesia with 
military personnel accused of human rights violation have displayed significant similarities to 
the ad hoc trial for East Timor. The prosecution refrains from pressing their case, treats cases 
as individual not systematic patterns, and does not probe for superior responsibility. Sentences 
are minor, and after appeals, the majority are acquitted.236 The trials have given little, if any 
impetus towards democratisation and the rule of law. This makes clear that the utility of trials 
as a mechanism to further Indonesian democratisation is low. Legal accountability is in the 
first place highly dependent on structural change. There need to be democratic reforms 
promoting professionalism before accountability can be reached. This means that the legalist 
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paradigm falters also for Indonesia. To argue as Matthew Draper does, that justice for past 
atrocities can be a ‘building block’ in establishment of democracy puts the reality on its 
head.237 Democratic reforms providing professionalism in the judiciary and ceasing the 
military’s influence over prosecution can give justice, but not the other way around. 
 
4.4 Summary 
Due to the Indonesian military-political confluence, the sensitive political situation between 
East Timor and Indonesia, and an uncommitted UN, neither the Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta nor 
the Serious Crimes Process in East Timor managed to establish satisfactory legal 
accountability for past atrocities. Still, the consequences of lack of prosecutorial justice for 
past crimes have not been as dramatically detrimental as it is at times claimed they should be. 
The empirical research on East Timor, Indonesia and other case studies, show that while 
morally appealing, the causal claims legalists make about consequences – i.e. the rule of law 
and conflict prevention, are not backed by factual evidence. Justice for past crimes does not 
automatically lead to rule of law and peace, and the lack of justice does also not account for 
the lack of rule of law and peace that is present in East Timor. East Timor’s problems are 
results of other deeper structural and institutional factors, which requires more than justice for 
past atrocities to be improved. Structural reform and capacity-building with emphasis on 
professionalism and respect for human rights is a prime requirement for improved rule of law. 
Substantial economic and social advancement would also lessen the potential for instability, 
while the government also needs to provide mechanisms for peaceful resolution of grievances.  
 
It can therefore be concluded that it is too simple and naive to argue that the lack of rule of 
law and violence that has been present in East Timor since 1999 can be explained solely or 
significantly by the lack of justice for past atrocities. Rather, it should be acknowledged that 
the tasks of providing justice for the past and building new systems of justice are both 
important, but entail separate goals, requirements and measures.  
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5. Reconciliatory measures and their outcomes 
As a result of the factors outlined in chapter three, several measures aimed towards 
reconciliation have been implemented. This chapter will discuss the most important of these 
and their outcomes. This includes the two truth-commissions, CRTR and CTF, and border 
meetings aimed towards dialogue and return of refugees will also be analysed as they have 
been quite significant. The core analysis in this chapter will be what positive or negative 
outcomes these measures have produced. The claims that the emotional-psychology approach 
makes about the utility of reconciliatory measures need to be assessed in the East Timorese 
context. Did the truth commissions really further individual and societal healing and lead to 
reconciliation and social harmony? The pragmatic approach must also be evaluated. Has the 
following of a politically pragmatic, reconciliatory course led to positive political 
consequences for the East Timorese? Also, these reconciliatory measures have been criticised 
for undermining or not contributing to the pursuit of justice, but is this really true? 
 
The border meetings and the two truth commissions will first be discussed. Then some 
attention will be given to how the reconciliatory emphasis in the transitional justice process 
has affected East Timor’s most important external political asset – the relationship to 
Indonesia. Lastly it will be discussed how the process of transitional justice has corresponded 
to public perceptions of justice and reconciliation in East Timor. This has been touched upon 
throughout the text but an overall evaluation can be useful. The success or failure of any 
transitional justice approach should be evaluated by the extent that it goes to meet popular 
aspirations. 
  
5.1 Border meetings 
As a response to the two internal challenges of conflict prevention between pro-integration 
and pro-independence groups, and the return of refugees, a series of border meetings were 
initiated in 2000. They came about not only as a solution to practical problems, but most 
importantly from the conviction of the SRSG, and the pro-independence faction (CNRT) 
under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão, that these problems should be addressed in a 
reconciliatory style. The SRSG and the pro-independence leadership both had a shared worry 
about the fragility of the political situation, mindful of the violence that had erupted last time 
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the East Timorese were given a hope of self rule in 1975 and 1999.238 They saw it as vital to 
create engagement and dialogue between the parties in order to hinder more conflict. They 
were also supported by parts of the Catholic Church under the leadership of Bishop 
Nascimento. Together they advocated forgiveness and offered support and encouragement to 
return and reintegration of the refugees. 
 
In the beginning the meetings were exclusively between the pro-independence and pro-
integration leadership.239 Gusmão himself participated and played an active role. They were 
significant in opening up for dialogue between the parties, but did not significantly further the 
return of refugees. The pro-independence leaders therefore decided to move down in the 
societal echelons and approach the refugees directly.240 Meetings in and around refugee 
camps surrounding the border were arranged to bring refugees together with their former 
community members to talk, and dissolve false rumours and accusations planted by militia 
leaders.241 The project received sharp criticism by the UNTAET Human Rights Unit and the 
Serious Crimes Unit as some of the refugees were given immunity from crimes in order to 
participate. Both units complained that reconciliation was prioritised before justice.242 
However, the SRSG stood behind Gusmão, and the meetings continued. They turned out to be 
very successful, producing dialogue and confrontation, but also reconciliation.243 The 
situation loosened, and as a result, several of the refugees started returning.244 The talks also 
spurred visits by the militia leaders to their former communities in East Timor to evaluate 
whether they could resettle. Many ended up going back, to face a process of confrontation and 
reintegration in their old communities.245 There were some minor violent incidents, but none 
critical to domestic stability.  
 
The meetings did undermine the pursuit of justice. The returning militia leaders often enjoyed 
a de facto amnesty, some entered into further reconciliatory programs in East Timor which 
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barred them from prosecution.246 Notwithstanding, the meetings also succeeded in their aims 
of opening up for dialogue, and facilitating the repatriation of refugees. These reconciliatory 
achievements were significant for many reasons. It was firstly symbolically crucial for East 
Timor as a state to have all its citizens within its borders. Secondly, it was important for the 
refugees themselves as innocent civilians not to be held against their will in a foreign state. 
Thirdly, the political situation was still volatile. If unresolved, the refugee issue could easily 
have caused instability by the border and endangered the relations with Indonesia. Lastly, for 
East Timor’s internal stability it was essential to resolve some of the antagonisms between the 
former pro-integrationist and the pro-independence group.247 It should be mentioned that the 
public mostly accepted and supported Gusmão and the other leader’s appeals to show 
forgiveness and aid the returning refugees. Most agreed with the need for reconciliation and 
wanted broad inclusion in the new state.248 Even though some hard-liners still remained, most 
low ranking former militia members of members of Indonesian administration were 
successfully repatriated, along with thousands of other innocent civilians. The reconciliatory 
approach advocated by the Catholic Church, CNRT and Gusmão with the support of the 
SRSG, must be credited with these positive outcomes.  
 
5.2 Truth commissions 
The leading authority on the subject of truth commissions, Priscilla Hayner, defines truth-
commission as “official bodies set up to investigate and report on a pattern of past human 
rights abuses”.249 The idea of truth commissions as a constructive way of dealing with past 
atrocities is relatively new. From being an unknown concept a few decades ago, they have 
flourished in the last twenty years. According to Hayner, the positive functions of truth 
commissions can be one or more of the following: “to discover, clarify, and formally 
acknowledge past abuses; to respond to specific needs of victims; to contribute to justice and 
accountability; to outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms; to promote 
reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past”.250 This sits neatly within the emotional-
psychology approach. The following evaluation of the truth commissions in East Timor will 
consider how they have contributed towards these aims. In addition it will also assess whether 
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they actually produced political benefits, since they, and especially the CTF, have been so 
castigated for ‘political justice’. 
 
5.2.1 The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CRTR) 
The Commission for Reception Truth and Reconciliation (CRTR) was instituted by UNTAET 
regulations in 2001, after pressure from Gusmão and other political leaders.251 It started 
operating in February 2002 and ended its work on October 31, 2005. The mandate of CRTR 
was mainly threefold. The commission was tasked to establish the truth concerning human 
rights violations that had taken place from April 25, 1974 to October 25, 1999, and gather all 
its findings in a “comprehensive report”.252 Secondly, it was to assist victims, promote human 
rights and reconciliation. This work was predominantly focused internally, with special 
consideration to reintegration of refugees and perpetrators of low-level crimes.253 The term 
‘reception’ in the commission’s title referred to this task of return and reintegration. Lastly, it 
was to recommend measures that could further the Commissions objectives, help victims and 
prevent future human rights violations.254 It could also recommend prosecutions to the office 
of the General Prosecutor.255 An important strength of the CRTR was that it possessed several 
judicial features.256 It had wide investigative powers, the authority to have public hearings, 
give sanctions, immunity and fair trial guarantees.257 This quasi-judicial character was 
beneficial as it facilitated investigation, and gave incentives for cooperation to perpetrators.  
Moreover, the CRTR could also determine whether acts were of serious or less serious nature 
– perpetrators suspected of serious crimes would be transferred to the General Prosecutor.  
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The CRTR’s achievement in the area of truth-telling must be noted as significant. Hayner and 
Minow remark how an important advantage of truth commissions compared to tribunals is 
their potential to go broader and deeper in their investigations and conclusions. As such they 
can contribute to a more balanced and veracious understanding of the past.258 The CRTR 
truth-seeking efforts obtained this potential, which made it valuable in many aspects. While 
other truth-commissions have been blamed for selectivity, narrowness and bias, the end result 
of the CRTR’s work – a 2500-pages report titled Chega! is widely seen as an extensive, 
detailed and accurate record of human rights violations in East Timor under the Indonesian 
occupation.259 It focused on a wide range of offences, including issues as sexual violence and 
forced displacement that have been left out in other reports.260 Chega! undermined the 
Indonesian view of the events, and concluded that there was extensive evidence that the 
violence in 1999 was a planned, scorched-earth campaign which high-ranking TNI-officers 
knew about beforehand. As the report identified perpetrators by name, it established 
accountability, though not in a legal sense. At the same time, the report was a fair narrative 
that acknowledged East Timorese complicity in past atrocities, on both sides of the conflict. 
With its wide-ranging mandate period stretching back to the start of the “Carnation 
Revolution” in 1974, its documentation of human rights violations included also the period of 
civil war prior to the Indonesian invasion. The decision to include this period in the 
commissions work showed how the political elite were open to accept critique and blame for 
past human rights violations.261 Nevertheless, the report also emphasised how cooperation 
between East Timorese factions led to final victory. Chega! thus became a historical text with 
the potential of promoting unity in the new state.262 As Hayner remarks, conflict often recurs 
in societies where there is a lack of consensus on past events, with Latin American states, the 
former Yugoslavic countries and Israel-Palestine as examples.263 Here, different perceptions 
of the past is both a cause of conflict and an obstacle to reconciliation. The CRTRs 
achievement of creating a balanced, unified version of history should therefore be 
acknowledged. In addition to outlining East Timorese and Indonesian accountability for 
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atrocities, it was also progressive and discussed the role and responsibility of international 
actors.  
 
Truth and knowledge of the past is often very important to the population involved, this was 
apparent in East Timor. The CRTR, though established by the UN, had great broad public 
support, and it was essentially an East Timorese project, with mostly domestic staff.264 In a 
study of torture survivors, Elizabeth Stanley found that many greatly appreciated the 
disclosures done by the CRTR, and saw it as vital to ensure that the atrocities not were 
forgotten.265 Another study of East Timorese community expectations to independence 
revealed a strong, shared desire among participants to know the truth about past atrocities. 
Many also wanted the establishment of a common, accurate Timorese history.266 Based on 
over 8000 statements from victims and perpetrators, Chega! gave this Timor-centric 
narrative.267 It is unlikely that this documentation would have taken place had it not been for 
the CRTR.268  
 
Hayner writes that one of the most important functions of a truth commission is its ability to 
prevent violence and atrocities and promote to reconciliation and peace – but often this 
remains an unfulfilled objective. As she mentions, even in the case of the paradigmatic South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission – that was so built around this goal, it is still 
uncertain whether this was obtained.269 The CRTR on the other hand did give significant 
contributions to reconciliation. In the case of truth-telling, it is generally contentious whether 
truth causes reconciliation. However, it should be recognised that without truth the possibility 
for reconciliation is slim, as victims need to know what has happened, and by who, in order to 
reconcile.270 Therefore, truth-telling at least facilitates reconciliation. A fair and accurate 
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historical account can enable parties to find a new perspective to view past relations and 
cycles of distrust and hatred can be broken. Chega! represents such a text. 
 
A further integral part of CRTRs work towards reconciliation was the Community 
Reconciliation Processes (CRPs). They combined truth with a community-centred, restorative 
justice approach. Each process involved aspects of traditional justice, mediation, arbitration, 
truth-seeking, criminal and civil law. The CRPs were intended to promote repatriation of 
refugees and reconciliation, and as a much needed way to address perpetrators of smaller 
crimes. The SCP went slow, and covered only the most serious crimes, while there were 
numerous low level perpetrators one had no mechanism for dealing with. The CRPs 
functioned in the following manner. A perpetrator who wanted to participate would give a 
written statement admitting responsibility for past offences. Given that the offense was of a 
less serious character, the commission would arrange a hearing.271 Here perpetrator(s) and 
victim(s) met, the perpetrator could explain, clarify and apologise, while victims and other 
members of the community could ask questions and make statements. In the end a CRP-panel 
would negotiate a reconciliation agreement whereby the perpetrators had to undertake certain 
‘reconciliatory acts’ and in return they would be accepted back into the community.272 At the 
end of the process a reconciliation ceremony was held in accordance with customary practice. 
 
The CRPs were generally very successful. The inclusion of traditional methods of conflict 
resolution significantly increased the popular support, understanding of and effectiveness of 
the process.273 The process was voluntary, but still over 200 hearings were held where more 
than 1,400 perpetrators came forward.274 In total over 30,000 people attended, and at the time 
the process was closed down the commission noted strong popular demands for its 
continuance.275 This is a testimony of the desire and support for the measure. The CRPs 
contribution to national reconciliation and stability was noteworthy. Many participants gave 
feedback to the commission on how it had served as a conflict-resolution mechanism settling 
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old and new disputes, and furthered social peace in their communities.276 A report for the 
UNDP stated that: “there is a widespread feeling that the CRPs have definitely contributed to 
building social cohesion and relieving tension in many places, (…) there is broad 
acknowledgment from victims and deponents that the Commission played its neutral role with 
considerable dexterity”.277 It was further described as quick and just, and contributing to a 
return to normalcy. It facilitated to the reintegration of several perpetrators in their former 
communities. The CRTR did a survey in 2003 that revealed that 90 per cent of the ones 
involved had found the experience positive and were content with the results.278 Victims 
responded that they felt more respected. They also commented that the process had increased 
their awareness and understanding of the context of the violations, and made it easier to 
forgive and reconcile. Still, forgiveness depended on the confession by perpetrator. It was 
important that full and honest disclosure took place and that sincere remorse was expressed. 
The nature or degree of punishment in the ‘reconciliatory act’ was not of importance. Victims 
and survivors mainly wanted to know the truth – and often subjected the perpetrators to 
rigorous questioning after the confession for more information.279 Finally, respondents stated 
that they believed the reconciliation achieved would be lasting. 280 
 
Truth commissions are criticised by legalist scholars as they are afraid it will be used as an 
alternative to legal justice, but the CRTR furthered the cause of justice and accountability. It 
was intended to complement the work of the Serious Crimes Process, not replace it.281 The 
CRPs notably served to establish accountability for several low-level perpetrators who would 
otherwise not be dealt with.282 Though they did not serve prison sentences, they were given a 
practical sanction for their offence. In addition to the sanction, the hearing and the following 
acts of reconciliation was a distressing and humiliating process. Studies done afterwards 
revealed that for most perpetrators the experience had a determining effect on the lives.283 
Most also found it to be positive, that it had helped them both mentally and practically, 
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facilitating a peaceful reintegration with their old communities.284 By holding minor 
perpetrators accountable, the CRP also helped unburden the strained Serious Crimes Process.  
 
There was however one flaw in the relationship between CRPs and the Serious Crimes 
Process that undermined the positive reputation of the CRPs. If the CRPs discovered high 
level perpetrators, these cases would be transferred to the Office of the General Prosecutor as 
they constituted serious crimes. But due to the limited capacity of the Serious Crimes Process, 
most of these perpetrators never became indicted.285 Barred from entering the CRP as it was 
reserved for low level crimes only, they enjoyed impunity. This inconsistency angered many 
victims and low-level perpetrators who went through the CRP, but had the Serious Crimes 
Process functioned properly, the CRTR probably have been viewed more positively as a part 
of a holistic framework to past atrocities. 
 
The CRP opened for a very controversial issue in the transitional justice literature – amnesty. 
Criticised from a legalist perspective as undermining justice, amnesty is recognised by 
pragmatists as useful instruments to facilitate participation and cooperation in political 
processes – a bargaining chip. The amnesty offered through the CRTR should be credited as 
very limited and conditional that did not undermine the pursuit of justice for serious crimes, 
but gave positive consequences. In other truth commissions where amnesty has been utilised, 
the use of amnesty has been criticised as it erodes the duty to prosecute serious violations of 
human rights. This was also the case for the oft commended South African TRC as it 
indiscriminately held the power to give full individual amnesties to perpetrators of both 
serious and less serious crimes. The East Timorese CRPs only dealt with less serious crimes, 
and hence did not violate this principle. CRTR-regulation also specifically stated that 
perpetrators of “serious criminal offenses” were not to be given amnesty.286 Moreover, as in 
the South African TRC, immunity through the CRP was dependent on full revelation of 
misdeeds, and that these were connected to the “political conflict”.287 In addition the CRP 
process made amnesty further conditioned on an act of contrition. If a deponent failed to 
perform the act of reconciliation he would receive a financial sanction of $3,000 or be 
                                                 
284
 Kent, “Community views”, 62.; Burgess, “A new approach”, 188. 
285
 Hirst and Varney, “Justice Abandoned”, 14. 
286
 UNTAET REG2001/10, Section 32. 
287
 Stahn, “Accomodating Individual”, 963.; UNTAET REG 2001/10, Section 32. 
~ 69 ~ 
 
sentenced to 1 year of imprisonment.288 These stringent regulations combined with a credible 
threat of prosecution by the SCP greatly furthered participation and cooperation from 
perpetrators.289 
 
While truth commissions are more focused on victims and survivors than trials, it is still an 
open question how much assistance they can offer, and whether they can contribute to 
individual as well as societal healing as the emotional psychology paradigm purports. The 
CRTR emphasised the community and its interests in truth-finding. This was a strength of the 
process as it facilitated community reconciliation, but it could at times be detrimental to the 
needs and interests of the individual victims.290 Statements from participants indicated that on 
some accounts, truth was not told, and this was not addressed by the CRTR personnel due to 
familial or political relations.291 This is a problem one can recognise from other truth 
commissions, but it is still a serious issue.292 In some cases, informal pressure from 
communities was influential for victims to accept reconciliation agreement. Still, it should be 
noted that identity in East Timor is a more communal than individual concept, and many 
therefore did not mind the communal focus but saw it as natural.293 Further, whether truth-
telling led to individual mental healing, is uncertain. Some psychiatrists, such as Silove et. al, 
have been critical to the CRPs psychological effects. They have remarked how few CRTR 
personnel had any mental health education, and the victims were given little professional help 
to cope with the emotionally stressful situations. Therefore, though the process was 
experienced as relieving and healing for some, it can have exacerbated trauma for others.294 
However, as both Hayner and Minow point out, truth commissions are not aimed towards 
therapy, but truth-finding.295 The CRTR was mandated to “assist in restoring the human 
dignity of victims”, but was not focused on offering mental healing.296 But as many victims 
and survivors have a psychological need to tell their story, truth commissions offer a forum 
for this. For some this can be cathartic and relieving. As Minow writes, “healing trauma is the 
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work of therapists, but a commission can offer healing moments”. 297 She points to 
psychological evidence that truth commission’s disclosure and acknowledgement can help 
victims confront the past, make sense of it, mourn and then initiate efforts to heal and 
reconcile.298 The South African TRC showed that for some this held true, for others not.299 
There are no systematic studies done on this subject in East Timor, but anecdotal evidence 
suggests a similar experience.300 
 
Moreover, many victims are often quoted to have remained unsatisfied with the CRTR, as 
they desired measures the commission did not have, mainly reparations and legal justice.301 
The CRTR paid out small “Urgent Reparations”, but did not contain any large reparations 
program. However, “Chega!” listed recommendations both for East Timor, Indonesia and the 
international society, to give reparations and on how to continue to promote legal justice. 
Again, ironically, though the CRTR was a reconciliatory measure, it served to strengthen the 
demand for accountability. It recommended that the Serious Crimes Process should be 
revived, with mandates stretching back from 1975 to 1999.302 And further, that Indonesia 
should cooperate on extradition, undertake judicial reforms and “genuinely pursue justice”.303 
If these measures should fail the UN was recommended to establish an international 
tribunal.304 Moreover, it recommended that reparations should be paid, most crucially by the 
state of Indonesia, as it bore “the greatest moral and legal responsibility” for the destructions 
it had caused, but also other states or companies who had aided, acquiesced or benefited in 
Indonesia’s occupation, were “obliged to provide reparations”.305 Lastly, the report 
recommended that Indonesia, and states which had cooperated militarily with Indonesia 
should officially apologise for past crimes.306  
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To sum up, the CRTR achieved most of the objectives of its mandate, and many of the goals 
Hayner outlined. It was a significant success in the area of truth-telling and history writing. 
This was valued by a large part of the public, and can become an important public asset for 
future nation-building. Moreover, the CRP process was crucial in facilitating the return and 
reintegration of refugees, and contributed to communal peace and stability. Besides producing 
reconciliation, the truth commission also furthered the cause of justice. It held several low 
level perpetrators responsible, and as such complemented the SCP. With its very limited 
amnesty provisions, it did not violate international principles or undermined the pursuit of 
justice for serious crimes. The recommendations underlined the need for justice. On the other 
hand, the CRTR did not solve all problems related to past human rights abuses. More 
professional psychological assistance would probably have been beneficial for some victim’s 
mental health. At the same time, as Minow remarks, if truth-commissions are to increase 
emphasis on therapeutic functions, they may have to depart more from the criminal justice 
approach that they have been credited for.307 Lastly, as the SCP, the CRTR suffered from lack 
of cooperation from Indonesia. No Indonesian nationals came under scrutiny from the CRPs, 
and there is still a vast amount of documentation of Indonesian transgressions exclusively in 
Indonesian hands. Due to the sensitive political climate, the recommendations are yet to be 
implemented. As the pragmatic approach would support, recommendations of truth 
commissions need a positive political climate, or significant pressure to be carried out.308 This 
was not present in East Timor. Due to worries of reactions from Indonesia, Gusmão hesitated 
making the CRTR report public, and criticised the recommendations for further legal 
measures as “grandiose idealism”.309 His criticism could have been justified. The report was 
ultimately made public in February 2006, but the recommendations have remained 
unaccomplished. Indonesia rejected the report, while important Western parties as the USA 
and the UK have paid it little attention.310  
 
5.2.2 Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) 
The last institutional attempt so far to address the past is the Commission of Truth and 
Friendship (CTF). It was established in August 2005 as a joint project between the Indonesian 
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and East Timorese government, with five East Timorese and five Indonesian members. The 
CTF has from the outset been heavily criticised by human rights NGOs and the UN.311 Seeing 
it from a legalist perspective, it was denounced for its absent concern to promote legal justice. 
The CTF had no judicial mandate and no prosecutorial powers. It focused on institutional not 
individual responsibility.312 Most criticised from a legalist point of view, was the mandate to 
recommend means to “heal the wounds of the past”, which entailed “recommend[ing] 
rehabilitation measures for those wrongly accused” and to recommend amnesty for “those 
who cooperate fully”.313 The rules for granting of amnesty were ambiguous and there were 
concerns that it could open for impunity for high-ranking Indonesian military personnel.314 
The Commissions ability to function as a truth-finder was also doubted. Unlike the CRTR’s 
quasi-legal structure, the CTF lacked clear and extensive investigative powers that could 
facilitate the commissions work.315 There was further concern for how the commission’s 
terms of reference emphasised closure and finding the “conclusive truth”, but at the same 
time, the mandate was restricted to only investigate the year 1999, thus ignoring the important 
historic pre-context.316 The CTF has been criticised for paying scant attention to victim’s 
interest and therefore not contributing to reconciliation. Critics slashed the commission’s 
terms of reference (CTF-TOR) for not even mentioning the word ‘victims’, while at the same 
time being so generous towards perpetrators with its amnesty provisions. Throughout the 
hearings witness support and protection was inadequate, and perpetrators were given more 
time to speak than witnesses.317 There was also concern that no threat of prosecution gave 
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perpetrators little incentives to tell the truth, their statements were biased and self-defending, 
and they were rarely subjected to rigorous questioning.318 Overall, the CTFs ability to 
contribute constructively to either truth or reconciliation was doubted, and there was 
widespread concern that the CTF would undermine the pursuit for justice. 
 
The CTF finished its work and handed over its final report to the presidents of East Timor and 
Indonesia on July 15, 2008.319 Despite the criticism, there are several reason to not to 
completely denounce the Commission, and rather actually accredit it. Firstly, the Commission 
should be viewed against the cause of its establishment and its mandate. The idea of an 
international commission was conceived by Gusmão and Ramos-Horta during 2004.320 It 
came as a response to growing international pressure for legal accountability, specifically to 
the forthcoming release of a report from the UN Commission of Experts (COE), which it was 
anticipated would call for an international tribunal to be set up.321 The two leaders, rightfully, 
saw this as a subject with great potential to destabilise their relationship to Indonesia. 
Moreover, they also knew that the international community would not master sufficient will 
to actually act on its recommendation. The result would be a vexatious situation with the East 
Timorese government pushed from many sides. They therefore acted pre-emptively. At a 
meeting with President Megawati in May 2004, Gusmão laid out his idea of an international 
truth-commission. The proposal met support from Indonesian state-leaders, but was after 
negotiations turned into a bilateral commission of truth and friendship. The CTF was 
therefore not established with the intention of being an exercise in legal justice. It was a 
political measure designed to promote reconciliation and an improved relationship between 
the two states.322 This has been the main criticism against the CTF. However, when viewed 
against the importance of East Timor to good relations to Indonesia, and the potential damage 
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talks of an international tribunal could entail, this was a constructive solution from a political 
perspective.  
 
At the same time, the commission’s outcomes were not as bad as anticipated. It should be 
underlined that the commission only had the power to recommend amnesty, it was up to the 
domestic parliaments to approve. However, ultimately, no recommendations were given.323 
Moreover, the report went further than most had expected. It emphasised that the violence of 
1999 could not be seen without relation to the earlier periods of conflict. And instead of 
undermining past efforts as many had feared, the report confirmed earlier reports and truth 
commissions. It concluded that the Indonesian government, TNI, pro-integration groups, and 
Indonesian police forces (Polri) had institutional responsibility for “gross human right 
violations”, including murder, torture, sexual violence, illegal detention and forced relocation 
of civilians.324 The report also found pro-independence groups guilty of illegal detention, but 
acknowledged that overall, most of the violations were done against pro-independence 
supporters. Most significantly, it challenged the outcome of the Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta by 
stating that “TNI personnel, police and civilian authorities consistently and systematically 
cooperated with and supported the militias in a number of significant ways that contributed to 
the perpetration of the crimes” – and listed as examples funding, organising, planning and 
participation of attacks as examples.325 It concluded that the “gross human rights violations” 
perpetrated in 1999 “constitute an organised campaign of violence”.326 The report further 
argued that the respective states had to accept state responsibility for these actions.327 Though 
the attempted balance in the report, by blaming both the state of Indonesia and East Timor for 
having responsibility for the atrocities of 1999, is an aberration, it’s conclusions are still 
closer to the truth than any previous official Indonesian accounts, and represent, in the words 
of an observer “a minor act of courage”.328 Despite the gloomy predictions, the CTF was not 
the whitewash many had been expecting, and repudiates the oft cited Indonesian view that the 
violence was only due to intra-Timorese fighting. This is of paramount importance for 
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Indonesia where the historical account of the occupation of East Timor has been so plagued 
by distortion. Confronting the tendency to acquit military and civil officers of responsibility, it 
has the potential of strengthening, not undermining further calls for justice.  
 
The report also came with several constructive recommendations. On the basis of seeing low 
respect for the rule of law, weak judicial institutions and little accountability for security 
forces as background to the violence in 1999, it recommended the establishment of several 
human rights training programs.329 It advocated institutional reforms to boost the respect and 
efficiency of institutions investigating and prosecuting human rights violations, and reforms 
concerning the military, emphasising democratic control. The report also advised the 
establishment of a Documentation and Conflict Resolution Centre (DCRC). Its tasks would be 
to collect and safeguard all documentation concerning the violence in 1999, and be a resource 
hub from which historical information can be shared between the nations. In addition the 
centre was to develop programs for conflict resolution and victim-support. There was further 
a recommendation to establish a commission for disappeared persons.330 Although there were 
no direct recommendations for prosecutions, these proposals were still highly conducive to 
strengthening of rule of law, democracy and human rights. If followed, the human rights 
training programmes and reform proposals can contribute more to future stability and 
democracy than tribunals alone. The DCRC has potential to educate the Indonesian public 
about the real story of occupation over East Timor. The Commission also gave 
recommendations concerning practical issues, such as cooperation on border and security 
policy, cooperation on health matters, cultural and educational exchanges and dual 
citizenship.331 These were definitively valuable political achievements for the government of 
East Timor. Lastly, the Commission recommended official acknowledgement, regret and 
apology from the state-leaders. On the official hand over of the report from the commission to 
the state-leaders on July 15, 2008, President Yudhoyono announced that he accepted the 
reports conclusions and said he felt “deep regret” for past atrocities.332 Although he did not 
issue a formal apology, it was the first time any representative of the state of Indonesia 
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acknowledged direct responsibility for the 1999 violence.333 It was probably a bitter pill to 
swallow, but an important first step towards greater acknowledgement in Indonesia of the 
military’s human rights abuses. Considering the commission’s potential impact it was 
significant that the final report came from a bilateral commission, which received formal 
acknowledgement from the Indonesian president as well as Timorese representatives. The 
truth that was established through the CTF therefore has better chance of changing popular 
Indonesian perceptions of history. As Hayner points out, South Africa’s TRC made it 
impossible to continue denial of apartheid’s horrors, “very few people will now defend or try 
to justify the system of apartheid” and the awful methods used to hold up this system.334 The 
CTF can have this function for Indonesia, to “lift a veil of denial”, or at least, in the words of 
Michael Ignatieff “narrow the range of permissible lies”.335 
 
5.3 East Timor’s relationship to Indonesia 
Since independence, East Timor has managed to establish what must be termed a good, 
functional relationship with Indonesia. The two states have come to respect each others 
territorial integrity. The possibility of a return to a 1999-scenario, which was a real threat in 
the UNTAET-period, has decreased significantly. An ICG report from 2006 found that former 
militia members were still been present in minor violent incidents near the border, but that 
this could not be seen as a continuation the 1999-campaign.336 The individuals were not 
united, and they were neither supported nor organised by the Indonesian military. The 
incidents have also been rare, and the most central problems have been smuggling and illegal 
border crossings. While a small part of the border still remain to be delineated, observers have 
argued that this is a tractable challenge.337 There has been regular bilateral consultation, and 
the two states have initiated significant economic cooperation. Indonesia is among East 
Timor’s main trade partners together with Australia, the EU, Japan and the US.338 Over 80 per 
                                                 
333
 Stephen Fitzpatrick, ”Jakarta ’Regrets’ East Timor Atrocities”, The Australian, July 15, 2008. 
334
 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 7, 25. 
335
 Michael Ignatieff, “Articles of Faith”, Index of Censorship, 25, no. 5, (1996): 113. ;Hayner, Unspeakable 
Truths, 25. 
336
 “Managing Tensions on the Timor-Leste / Indonesian Border”, International Crisis Group (ICG), no. 50, 
May 4, 2006: 3. 
337
 Ibid., 1. 
338
 “Background Note: Timor-Leste”, US Department of State, January 2009, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35878.htm 
~ 77 ~ 
 
cent of the state’s energy has come from Indonesia, along with 80 per cent of its food 
imports.339  
 
There is only one issue that has caused seriously negative reactions from Indonesia, namely 
the calls for legal accountability for past human rights violations. It was earlier mentioned 
how SCU’s indictment of high-ranking Indonesian officials met intense criticism from 
Jakarta. This has been repeated on several occasions. When the Chega! report was handed 
over from CRTR to the UN Secretary General, right-wing nationalists in Jakarta lashed out 
against the report.340 President Yudhoyono dropped a pre-arranged meeting with President 
Gusmão, and the official bilateral relationship got tense.341 However, as Gusmão and other 
members of the East Timorese political elite emphasised reconciliation, and other domestic 
Indonesian problems arose, the issue soon faded.342   
 
The otherwise generally positive relationship to Indonesia must be attributed to the efforts of 
East Timorese political leaders, most notably Xanana Gusmão. The diplomatic overtures from 
the East Timorese front have abounded. Gusmão has among other things lobbied for increased 
western aid and debt reductions to Indonesia, and along with other political leaders repeatedly 
emphasised respect for Indonesia’s territorial integrity.343 Another significant gesture was to 
invite several high-level Indonesian politicians to attend East Timor’s independence 
ceremony in May 2002 in Dili. Among the invited were President Megawati, and former 
president Wahid. They both accepted, though Megawati’s short attendance came after great 
political controversy in Jakarta and severe reluctance.344 The friendly overtures have as noted 
throughout this thesis also extended into the area of transitional justice. On every occasion 
when the SCP, CRTR or other talks of legal accountability has stirred outrage in Jakarta, 
Ramos-Horta and Gusmão have been quick to visit their neighbours and ensure them of their 
commitment to reconciliation and friendly relations. The CTF was an example of how this 
issue-area became mixed with a political desire for good relations. Though these overtures 
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have been criticised from human rights activists and legalist scholars, the bilateral relationship 
would probably most likely have been completely different without it. Though another 
invasion is less likely, the shared land-border with Indonesian West Timor could easily have 
become a target for destabilisation, and Indonesia could quickly have imposed destructive 
trade and transport blockades. For a state still struggling to offer its citizens basic goods like 
clean water, food and shelter, this could have been fatal. The last ten years’ diplomatic and 
economic cooperation from Indonesia has been important. Without it, both East Timor’s 
security and economic situation would have been far more gloomy.  
 
5.4 Public attitudes to justice and reconciliation 
Ultimately, a discussion of public attitudes to justice and reconciliation is in order. This issue 
has been touched upon earlier throughout the thesis, but it can be useful to recapitulate. Any 
decision on what measures to take for East Timor should be based on local desires and needs, 
and the transitional justice process should be evaluated after how it has corresponded to this. 
 
While observers have argued there is general popular support for ‘justice’ for human rights 
crimes, it has not always been clear what this entails. A report on local attitudes to justice by 
Pigou, found that justice was an unfamiliar and theoretical concept for many East 
Timorese.345 Still, most respondents agreed that those responsible for past human rights 
violations should be held accountable in some way. It was important that the atrocities were 
not left unaddressed. For many, this equalled formal prosecution and punishment.346 Though 
Harper has noted how East Timorese often differentiated. Lower-level militia members were 
seen as less responsible and deserved more leniency.347 There has been understanding that 
these criminals often were forced or deceived into the militias. The ones most responsible of 
the most serious crimes, such as Indonesian officers, police officers and leaders of the militia 
on the other hand, should be prosecuted and punished. However, it can still be questioned if 
legal prosecution would have entirely satisfied the need for justice. The experience of SCP 
showed that culpability was apportioned by collective knowledge and group-think 
processes.348 If enough people thought someone to be guilty – he or she was guilty. Justice for 
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many did therefore not consist of prosecution according to international standards, where the 
empirical evidence would determine the sentencing, but rather when someone who was 
collectively classified as “guilty” was convicted and imprisoned. A defining characteristic of a 
fair process of justice is the uncertainty and chance that guilty people will walk free, 
otherwise it would be a show trial. In other words, there will always exist a possibility that 
East Timorese public perceptions of justice will not be fulfilled, even when there is ‘justice’ 
in a legal sense.  
 
Victims and survivors after atrocities often stress a desire for acknowledgement of guilt, and 
expression of a sincere apology and heartfelt remorse from the perpetrator. According to 
Minow, psychological studies have also shown this to be for personal healing.349 Pigou’s 
report found this central in the East Timorese context as well. A large number of East 
Timorese stressed the importance of confession and apologies.350 This is in line with 
traditional forms of justice, where confession, apology and reparations are central elements. It 
is also consistent with a widespread demand among East Timorese to know the truth of past 
abuses. Pigou’s study found it imperative for most of the respondents to know what for many 
of them was unknown, and to construct a true and accurate narrative of the past - to have East 
Timor’s history written.351 Truth was also seen as a necessary base for legal measures and 
reconciliation, through admission of guilt and promotion of shared conceptions of the past.  
 
It should be underlined how traditional methods of justice are still widely recognised in East 
Timor. The legacy of Indonesian rule was a general distrust in the corrupt and authoritarian 
formal legal system.352 Many respondents in Pigou’s study saw justice more in the lines of 
traditional conflict resolution processes and emphasised elements of restorative justice, 
reparations and reconciliation.353 West has also noted that even if formal justice was fulfilled, 
a perpetrator would have to go through a process of traditional justice before he could be 
reintegrated into society.354  
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Reconciliation was seen by the majority of respondents in Pigou’s study as crucial. It was 
even described as a national duty and a moral imperative, necessary to bring the displaced 
back, build trust, and encourage social unity.355 A majority of the respondents also stated that 
they saw forgiveness as a central aspect of the reconciliation process, and that they were 
willing to forgive. At the same time, there was also an understanding that reconciliation could 
be difficult.356 Respondents in Pigou’s study disagreed on the relationship between justice and 
reconciliation. Some saw justice as a pre-requisite for reconciliation, others argued that 
reconciliation was necessary before justice. Still, most respondents agreed with Gusmão, that 
a process of justice must also include a process of reconciliation. There are few studies on 
reconciliation with Indonesia or Indonesian perpetrators.357 However, an analysis by Neto et 
al. from 2007, found a large majority of East Timorese open for intergroup forgiveness, even 
unconditional of acknowledgement, prosecution and/ or reparations.358 As Neto et al. argue, 
this might be because many of the perpetrators have been unwilling to take responsibility, and 
people have therefore resigned to forgiveness to attain closure.359  
 
Further, whether or not to utilise amnesty has been controversial issue in East Timor. Gusmão 
has been a vocal supporter of amnesty as a political act offered after conviction and 
sentencing. It has been strongly criticised by victim-, human rights-NGO’s, academics and 
domestic politicians from a legalist perspective, but some scholars as Drumbl, argue that in 
certain situations it can be more beneficial in the long-term than often acknowledged.360 In 
East Timor it did show to be helpful in facilitating the repatriation of several militia-members 
and refugees, and amnesty as advocated by Gusmão could have several further pragmatic 
advantages. Firstly, if the perpetrator has reconciled and been sentenced, it could facilitate 
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quick reintegration and rehabilitation.361 Secondly, it would take a burden off already strained 
judicial and correctional facilities. This would further benefit the meagre economy with 
released resources to social and economic development.362 In addition, as the majority of 
detainees in East Timor are only low-level criminals, it would not seriously violate principles 
of international humanitarian law. Lastly, East Timorese custom differs from Western 
tradition by allowing for limited sentences, as they are symbolically important. Punishment is 
not valued as a form of vengeance, but as a contribution to reconciliation. Therefore, small 
sentences could be enough for the popular conception to be that justice is fulfilled.363  
 
This discussion illustrates that ‘justice’ has not been a straight-forward concept in the East 
Timorese context. It has had many different connotations, and varied from person to person. 
Formal justice has been important for some, but primarily for the most serious crimes. In 
addition, traditional forms of conflict resolution that emphasise restorative justice and 
reconciliation have also been greatly valued. Amnesty, though criticised from a legalist 
perspective could have positive consequences and is too a certain extent compatible with 
traditional forms of justice. Therefore, the emphasis on local conflict resolution practices, 
truth and reconciliation as embodied in the transitional justice process in East Timor, has been 
close to popular aspirations. The lack of formal justice for perpetrators of the most serious 
crimes is nonetheless unfortunate, but still, if justice had been fulfilled, traditional processes 
of reconciliation would still have been necessary.  
 
5.5 Summary  
The reconciliatory measures produced many positive achievements. The advice of the 
pragmatist paradigm to follow the politically prudent course can be seen to have been 
beneficial for East Timor. The CRTR gave vital contributions to the repatriation of refugees, 
domestic stability and accountability. In many ways it greatly furthered societal reconciliation 
and national unity, which as mentioned in the introduction are necessary prerequisites for 
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democracy. Further, the prioritisation of reconciliation and repatriation of refugees through 
border meetings and the CRTR facilitated the return of more than 225,000 people by 2003.364 
The assumption of the emotional psychology approach that truth telling furthers individual 
and societal reconciliation partly held true in this context. For many, truth-telling was 
cathartic, and the CRPs which combined truth-telling with restorative justice gave a huge 
contribution to societal reconciliation. It should still be recognised that individual healing is a 
complex process that might require more time and assistance from professionals than truth 
commissions can offer. Hayner argues that “the expectations of truth commissions are almost 
always greater than what these bodies can ever reasonably hope to achieve”.365 There will 
therefore always be dissatisfaction connected to the outcomes of the commission. While some 
grievances can be legitimate, it should be acknowledged that there are limitations to what 
truth commissions can achieve, and that not all anticipations are realistic. As the 
dissatisfaction may obscure the positive outcomes of the commission it can be important to 
clarify to the public the aims and objectives of the commission, and offer other methods for 
dealing with societal demands, such as more mental health workers to help with trauma. 
 
The CTF has been censured for being a project of political negotiation, as opposed to 
research-based truth or justice. It proved however, to be less harmful than critics had 
expected. No recommendations were made for amnesty, and the final report supported the 
findings of CRTR and other investigations which held the Indonesian military primarily 
responsible for the most serious crimes. The CTF has potential to alter Indonesian history-
writing, and for East Timor and Indonesia to find a shared understanding of their history. The 
commission’s recommendations offered potential mechanisms for bilateral reconciliation and 
democratic growth and development for both parties. Even though the recommendations of 
both commissions still have left to be heeded, recommendations from governmental 
institutions such as these are potentially more influential than from civil society organisations, 
and can serve as a focal point for pressure groups.366  
 
A further positive consequence for East Timor of following a reconciliatory line towards 
Indonesia has been the development of a friendly and cooperative bilateral relationship. This 
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has been of crucial importance for East Timor’s security and economy. Lastly, it should be 
acknowledged that the emphasis on reconciliation and truth that has characterised the East 
Timorese transitional justice process is close to traditional methods of conflict resolution. 
Formal processes of justice have been wanted by some, but still, most agree that a process of 
justice must also include reconciliation. 
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6. Conclusion  
The main research questions in this paper were concerned with why the process of transitional 
justice in East Timor has been more reconciliatory than judicially focused, and what the 
consequences of this have been. The purpose was to see if there were valid reasons for the 
East Timorese government’s choice of this reconciliatory policy, and what consequences have 
derived from it. It was further also to question the negative impact of the lack of prosecution. 
As analytical tool, a division into three different approaches of transitional justice was made: 
a legalist approach stressing the utility and desirability of legal prosecution, a pragmatic 
approach emphasising prudence and political constraints, and an emotional psychology 
approach asserting social peace through reconciliatory measures. 
 
Regarding the first research question, this thesis has shown that there have been valid political 
and pragmatic reasons supporting the East Timorese government’s choice of a reconciliatory 
policy. Firstly, the most central hindrance to justice has been the military-political confluence 
in Indonesia. It has undermined any attempt at legal accountability from the outset. Further, as 
the international community have prioritised good relations to Indonesia, attempts at 
accountability have also not been credibly supported by external actors. This has been realised 
by East Timorese leaders, and East Timor’s weak position in the international society both 
economically and strategically has made reconciliation a more beneficial foreign-policy 
approach towards Indonesia. Reconciliatory policies have also been chosen because of 
internal political problems, and due to the conviction of prominent East Timorese leaders that 
both internal and external issues connected to past atrocities were best resolved through a 
reconciliatory approach. In addition, traditional forms of justice and conflict resolution which 
emphasise restorative justice and reconciliation have also influenced the process.  
 
The empirical answers to the first research question also explain why attempts at obtaining 
justice have been so little successful. Due to political concerns and low commitment, two 
tribunals did not produce justice for perpetrators of the most serious crimes. Still, the 
consequences of lack of prosecutorial justice have not been as detrimental as is often claimed 
could happen. The main outcome, as can be argued by empirical evidence, is that victims and 
survivors are disappointed over the lack of formal justice. While this is significant, it should 
be noted that the legalist argument that claims justice for past atrocities is necessary to 
promote the rule of law and hinder future conflict, is not supported by empirical evidence in 
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the East Timorese situation. The poor rule of law situation in East Timor can not indubitably 
be attributed to the lack of prosecutorial justice, rather it can be seen to lie mainly with other 
factors. To improve the rule of law situation and reduce violence and instability in East Timor 
several measures are needed, which are not connected to transitional justice. The two tasks of 
providing justice for past atrocities and building new systems of justice and democracy are 
both important goals, but differ in aims and measures required to obtain them. 
 
Further regarding the second research question, this thesis has also shown that the positive 
effects of the reconciliatory policies, including the policies involving a politically negotiated 
version of reconciliation, have been many. Internally, it furthered the return of 225,000 
refugees, helped them reintegrate into their former communities and greatly contributed to 
social peace. The CRTR with its mix of reconciliation based on research-based truth and 
political negotiation, gave vital contributions to national unity, future nation-building and 
democracy. The assumption of the emotional psychology paradigm that stability and peace 
can be attained through reconciliatory measures such as truth commission therefore mainly 
held true. Internal and external political tensions were avoided by not taking the 
confrontational-approach that prosecution would have entailed. Externally, a political-
negotiation based reconciliatory approach towards Indonesia has been greatly beneficial for 
East Timor’s security and economy. It is not to escape how the country’s future development 
also to a large extent hinges on friendly and cooperative relations with its neighbour. If East 
Timor is to join ASEAN, as it aspires to, approval from Indonesia is crucial.  
 
The efforts towards reintegration of refugees and former militia members did at times 
undermine the pursuit of justice, but it also gave very important, positive political 
consequences. At the same time, neither the CRTR nor the CTF undermined justice. In fact, 
they both served to aid the cause of justice and accountability through their work and 
recommendations. Hayner writes that increasingly, truth-commissions have shown to have 
beneficial long-term consequences.367 It should be emphasised that neither the CRTR nor the 
CTF hinders the establishment of judicial measures to try serious crimes. If future legal 
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prosecution ever occurs, the commissions’ contributions in the form of truth and 
documentation can be important.368 
 
Going back to the introduction it was mentioned how the central dilemmas in the transitional 
justice discourse revolves around whether there can be peace, stability and democracy without 
justice, and if there can be justice without a legal process. This thesis has shown that in the 
case of East Timor peace, stability and democracy is not dependent on justice for past 
atrocities. In fact, both internally and regarding the external relationship to Indonesia, the 
pursuit of justice would have been detrimental to bilateral peace and stability. It has further 
demonstrated that ‘justice’ can have various meanings for the population involved, which at 
times can be somewhat different to the Western concept of prosecutorial justice. 
 
This thesis also underscores that neither justice nor reconciliation is by itself sufficient to 
solve the many problems connected to past conflict and human rights violations in East 
Timor. Regarding individual healing, the CRTR clearly benefited some victims, survivors and 
perpetrators. However, it did not solve everyone’s problems, and especially some victims are 
still struggling with psychological issues from their experiences. Many victims and survivors 
are in need of greater psychological, medical and economical support as a consequence of the 
atrocities of the past. In other words, transitional justice measures, whether judicial or non-
judicial are no panacea. They cannot fix everything, and should not be expected to either. 
Time and other measures are also necessary to mend a broken society. As a consequence there 
should be a more realistic assessment of the opportunities and limits of transitional justice 
measures, both in East Timor and in other cases where severe human rights have taken place. 
The assumptions of the emotional psychology approach should be further analysed, to 
establish more concretely how and what reconciliatory measures can contribute to social 
peace. Most likely this will be very context-dependent. Especially, a more sober reflection of 
what justice for past atrocities actually can contribute with is in order. There should be done 
more studies, both qualitative and quantitative, to rigorously test the claims of the legalist 
paradigm. Are there some conditions under which tribunals, or a specific type of tribunal, can 
contribute significantly to rule of law and stability? Most likely there is, and these conditions 
should be identified. If they are not present, it should then be critically evaluated what the 
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possible gains, or losses, will be from having a tribunal. The East Timorese experience warns 
against the establishment of a hybrid tribunal in politically sensitive situations, or any 
tribunal, where neither host-country, nor international support can be credibly expected. As 
Reiger and Wierda comment, it is concerning that “around $20 million has been spent on a 
venture [the SCP] that no one in retrospect could seriously have expected to deliver 
meaningful results, and nor has it had much of a lasting legacy in terms of the domestic 
justice system”.369 As Kiss notes, the problem might be that we are in a situation where “can 
implies ought”.370 We have so many avenues for addressing past crimes and our moral 
imperatives tells us that something “ought to be done”. However, the pragmatic value of the 
action might actually not be substantial, or in fact negative. As was noticed in the discussion 
of the SCP – to give effective results, more time and resources was needed. When this is not 
forthcoming, the potential gains and consequences, both positive and negative should be 
assessed. 
 
Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that the right to decide what course to take regarding 
transitional justice should lie with the state and population in question. Not only of due to 
respect for sovereign integrity, or victims and survivors, but also because “it is that country 
that paid the price in the past and will have to live with the immediate and long-term 
consequences of the decisions made”.371 As the President, José Ramos-Horta, has stated:  
 
“Its great for the human rights activist to be heroic in Geneva and New York where they don’t have to 
live with the consequences of their heroism. They say we don’t care about the victims? We care, 
[Gusmão] and I have lost relatives, friends and comrades over the years. We know the cost of war, the 
value of peace and the necessity of reconciliation”.372  
 
Thakur warns that the new credo of ‘justice for atrocities’ could be turned into a wave of 
‘judicial colonialism’- where Westerners are “substituting their courts and morality for the 
choices made by the affected societies”.373 The legalist emphasis on prosecution, with no 
regard for actual political or other consequences, represents such a danger. This is not only a 
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question of political consequences. This case study has shown how valuable traditional forms 
of conflict resolution and justice were to address challenges connected to past atrocities and 
conflict. While these customs at times clash strongly with Western systems of justice, they 
still showed themselves very much tune with the concepts and requirements of the nation in 
need of the peacebuilding measures.374 This fact should not be underestimated, and it is a vital 
erudition that should be kept in mind for other post-conflict situations. 
 
The fact that justice has not been done in East Timor ten years on should still be seen as 
regrettable. For many victims and survivors it is of great symbolic value. And from a Western 
moral point of view it is easily appalling for many. At the same time, there are also calls for 
peace and security, and improved economic and social standards, increased employment 
opportunities and access to education and medical care.375 If East Timor is to develop and 
offer these benefits to its citizens, a functioning bilateral relationship with Indonesia is 
important. One can argue that this concerns two different issues, accountability for human 
rights crimes, and a good relationship to Indonesia, and that one should not mix them up. 
However, the politicised nature of the first issue in Indonesia implies that this separation is 
not possible in reality. 
 
Finally, the lack of justice for past crimes in East Timor is regrettable, but understandable. 
While the East Timorese attitude can be understood considering this small state’s precarious 
political situation and the high stakes involved, the UN’s hesitance to pressure for justice is 
harder to defend. The decision to not have an international tribunal in the first place was made 
in large part because the Indonesian President promised thorough prosecution internally. The 
UNSG did argue however, that if this process was not genuine – an international tribunal 
should be established.376 So far, the UNSG has not followed up on this statement. Had the UN 
taken a stronger stand against Indonesia, it could have lifted some of the responsibility and 
blame off the East Timorese, and possibly achieved more in the form of justice. The hesitance 
to do so is something the UN as an organisation and the international society must take 
responsibility for. If there is to be any further prosecutions, the international society, via either 
the UN or capable states such as the US, must take responsibility. East Timor cannot bear the 
political burden of antagonising Indonesia, and should not be expected to. It would also only 
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be fitting considering how the atrocities in East Timor were aided and abetted by an 
acquiescing world community. Sufficient commitment and resources must be present, 
however, otherwise another tribunal might end up like the SCP, potentially undermining 
instead of contributing to justice. 
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